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(ominous music)
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(engine rumbles)
(crowd cheers)
(bell rings)
(airplane roars past)
(siren rings)
(airplane roars)
(loud explosions)
(army marches)
(siren rings) (ominous boom)
(suspenseful music)
- [Narrator] This is the terrifying story
of the titanic duel fought
between the armies of Hitler and Stalin in the bitter cold
of an Arctic winter outside Leningrad.
It was here that the men of the German Army Group North
fought and died with the men of the Red Army.
The German forces were so constantly short of manpower
and material, that they christened the pitiless war
they were fighting, "The eternal war of the poor man".
(series of explosions)
The Russians too, had to endure terrible hardship.
And the siege of Leningrad contains heartrending tales
of suffering and heroism,
but the Russian sacrifice was ultimately to be vindicated.
For the men of Army Group North
there was to be no such satisfaction.
Most were destined never to return to Germany.
The ceaseless demands of the cruelest conflict in history
would ultimately claim the whole Army Group as its victim.
(ominous music)
In late 1940
when Adolf Hitler finally confirmed to the general staff
that he had irrevocably decided to attack Russia,
a plan was swiftly conceived by General Marcks
which envisaged a two pronged advance by two huge army
groups totaling over 3,500,000 men.
The German grand strategy
was for two great parallel advances.
The first aimed at Leningrad in the North,
then swinging South to Moscow.
And the second at Odesa on the black sea.
(ominous music)
During the winter of 1939,
Finland had been involved in an uneven struggle with Soviet
Russia to protect her territory.
Under the leadership of field marshal Mannerheim
the Fins had doggedly resisted
the superior Russian forces,
but ultimately had to yield
valuable territory around Leningrad.
Britain had refused to help the Fins who in 1941,
turned to Germany for aid in regaining their lost territory.
Hitler hoped to draw Finland
into an offensive war with Russia,
but the finish objective was simply to address the balance,
not the conquest of Russia.
Although the Fins would play a small part
in the battle for Leningrad,
their refusal to mount an invasion of Soviet territory
would ultimately have dire consequences for Hitler.
(ominous music)
Under the Marcks plan,
elements of Army Group North,
were to capture Leningrad,
then drive North to link up with the Fins
and eliminate all Russian forces
in the Baltic region.
Only then was Moscow to be attacked
from the West and North simultaneously.
(ominous music)
From the very outset
Hitler found it impossible to prioritize
the objectives for his Russian campaign.
After much discussion and argument,
the Marcks plan was subsequently revised to produce three
separate army groups.
Each aimed at a different objective.
Army Group North was to capture Leningrad,
Army Group Center was to capture Moscow
and Army Group South was aimed at Odesa.
With three major objectives to achieve
it was clear from the outset that German forces
would be dangerously overstretched.
Sections of the German military
were very opposed to the venture,
but Hitler refused to accept
the advice of his staff officers.
His gamblers instinct told him that if he delayed
even for one year,
the crowds that cheered the latest successes
so fervently, might no longer be willing to follow him into
so hazardous an undertaking.
And there was surely no greater military adventure
than the invasion of Russia.
(ominous music)
(building explodes)
(loud boom)
Following the spectacular victories in Poland, Norway,
France and the Balkans,
the German forces assembled for Barbarossa expected to fight
a short campaign,
which would secure their victories throughout Europe.
Hitler became convinced that he could crush the Red Army
as easily as he had defeated his other enemies.
In the spring of 1941
field marshal von Rundstedt,
who had spent most of the first world war
on the Eastern front, asked Hitler outright
if he knew what it meant to invade Russia.
The commander in chief, field marshal von Brauchitsch
and his chief of the general staff general Halder
also counseled Hitler against the operation.
It was all to no avail
as Hitler simply refused to heed their warnings.
Field Marshall von Rundstedt,
the commander of Army Group South
was forthright in his views on the forthcoming battle.
"This war with Russia is a nonsensical idea
to which I can see no happy ending.
But if for political reasons,
the war is unavoidable,
then we must face the fact that it cannot be won
in a single summer campaign.
Just look at the distances involved.
We cannot possibly defeat the enemy and occupy the whole
of Western Russia from the Baltic to the black sea
within a few short months.
We should prepare for a long war
and go for our objectives step by step.
First of all,
a strong Army Group North should capture Leningrad
and the area around it.
This would enable us to link up with the Fins,
eliminate the red fleet from the Baltic and increase
our influence in Scandinavia.
The central and Southern army groups should
for the time being
advance only to align running Odesa, Kiev,
Orsha, Lake Ilmen.
Then if we have sufficient time this year
Army Group North could advance Southeast
from Leningrad towards Moscow while Army Group Center
move eastwards on the capital.
All further operations should be postponed until 1942,
when we should make new plans based on the situation
as it then is."
Had Hitler followed von Rundstedt's good advice,
the history of the Western world may well have followed
a very different pattern.
Hitler, however, did have good grounds
for rejecting the advice of his officers.
(ominous music)
While the German army in the 1930s had been building
its strength under Hitler,
Stalin had been destroying the Russian officer Corps.
By the end of the purge,
the Russian army had lost three of the five remaining
marshals of the Soviet union,
all 11 deputy ministers of defense,
75 of the 80 members of the military Soviet,
all the commanders of the military districts,
13 of the 15 army commanders,
more than half the Corps commanders
and approximately 30% of the officers
below brigade level.
Stalin had considered himself safe
as he did not intend to become involved in Western affairs.
He had made complex peace treaties
and alliances with both Britain and Germany
and hoped they would fight a mutually destructive war
in the West.
(suspenseful music)
Less than one year later, however,
Stalin's hopes of a protracted war between the Western
powers and Hitler, evaporated with the brilliant success
of Hitler's Blitzkrieg tactics, which saw Denmark, Norway,
Holland, Belgium, and France fall in rapid succession.
The lightning campaign through the Balkans in Greece in 1941
could only produce more grounds for disquiet.
Though Stalin accepted that war with Germany
was now almost inevitable,
he certainly did not expect to be attacked in 1941.
He decided Russia had at least until the spring of 1942
to prepare herself.
His explosive denials of all contrary
information was so fierce that vital intelligence concerning
German preparations was kept from him by subordinates
fearful of the violence of his temper.
As the German buildup towards operation Barbarossa continued
Stalin's attempts to pacify Hitler grew more desperate.
He had already stated in an interview with Pravda
in November 1939,
that it was not Germany who had attacked Britain and France,
but Britain and France who had attacked Germany.
Stalin now forbade
any criticism of Germany to be printed in the newspapers.
In 1940, he increased Russian supplies
to Germany and withdrew
recognition of the Norwegian
and Belgian governments in exile.
In the following year
when Hitler successfully invaded
Greece and Yugoslavia, Stalin quickly expelled
the Yugoslavian ambassador
to Moscow and refused a request
to recognize the Greek government in exile.
Stalin felt he was continuing to buy time with these
unrequited concessions, but his use of the breathing space,
which he had already obtained was totally devoid of any
worthwhile attempt to remedy his military disadvantages.
(ominous music)
(slow suspenseful music)
The main Russian force charged with defending Leningrad
was the Northwest Front under Kuznetsov.
In theory, the Russian forces
were larger and more generously supplied
with tanks, guns, and aircraft.
In practice, the Red Army as a whole
proved to be so demoralized by
internal disruptions that they were disastrously unprepared.
In addition, much of the Russian equipment
was obsolete or unserviceable
with the result that in the opening battles at least,
there was to be no real contest.
As a result of Stalin's purges,
the Soviet forces were less than equal to the task
of combating a highly professional, well organized army,
which was accustomed to success on the battlefield.
(melancholy music)
Many divisions where between six to 7,000 men short
of wartime establishment.
Levies of experienced personnel had been hived off to build
new tank and aviation units.
Only one of the six Soviet mechanized Corps had received
their full compliment of equipment.
Three of the four motorized divisions
had no tanks whatsoever.
And four out of every five vehicles
in the tank fleets were obsolete.
Four of the Corps could only deploy one quarter of their
designated motor vehicles.
And in another four Corps
one in three motor vehicles needed repairs.
From even a cursory analysis,
the Soviet Red Army and the German Wehrmacht
were anything but equal adversaries.
(man speaks over radio)
(loud explosions)
In the Western part of Russia,
the Red Army consisted of about 5,000,000 men
with 1,000,000 in the Leningrad sector.
Although the tank strength of the Red Army
on the 21st of June, 1941 was an impressive 23,108 machines,
only 8,000 were battle ready and in good condition.
Of these, less than 1200 were deployed
in the Leningrad sector.
Many of the Soviet tanks where the outdated T26
and T28 medium tanks,
there were even a few of the outdated T35 machines,
a massive multi turreted tank,
which proved to be a disastrous failure in action.
(ominous music)
In June, 1941
the time of the German attack,
Army Group North was commanded
by field Marshall Ritter Von Leeb
and was composed of two subsidiary armies.
The 16th army, initially commanded by field Marshall Busch
and the 18th army commanded by general Von Kuchler.
For the initial thrust into Russia
under the Barbarossa directive
Army Group North enjoyed the support
of a powerful tank force
designed as Panzer Group IV under the leadership
of general Hoepner.
For air support Army Group North could call
upon Luftflotte One, commanded by general Keller.
The Stukas of Luftflotte One
were to provide the flying artillery
for the lightning attack of the 22nd of June.
Naval support was available from the powerful battle group
North under the command of Admiral Carls,
who set about planning the campaign
with his senior commanders.
As commander of Army Group North
Von Leeb had excellent credibility.
He had formerly commanded the German Army Group center,
which had succeeded brilliantly in the attack
on France in 1940.
He was extremely well-supported by some of the most capable
commanders the German army had in its ranks.
As the German officers could draw on the experiences
of the war in Poland, France, Norway, and the Balkans,
the quality of their commanders was always likely
to be superior to that of the Russians.
(ominous music)
For the great assault on Russia,
Army Group North could count
on over 800,000 men and 800 tanks
organized into three armored divisions,
three motorized infantry divisions,
20 infantry divisions, and three security divisions.
(Hitler yells)
(soldiers singing)
Army group North was by no means the armored juggernaut
of popular mythology.
Four-fifths of the soldiers had to walk
into battle like the soldiers of Napoleon
over a century earlier.
(upbeat German music)
In 1941, the mechanized era
was still in its infancy
and Army Group North
needed 200,000 horses to draw their guns and equipment.
(German war music)
The Army Group could deploy 1200 guns
in terms of tanks and aircraft,
Army Group North could boasts 600 tanks and 430 aircraft.
Most of them superior to the Russian tanks
and all of them in better condition.
Army Group North tends to be treated in some respects
as the poor relation
compared to Army Group South and army group Center.
But initially, although there were fewer formations
of Army Group North,
they actually achieved their initial objectives
with great skill and speed.
(vehicle explodes)
(engine rumbles)
(gun fires)
(loud blast)
Ribbentrop, Hitler's foreign minister had successfully
concluded a non-aggression pact
between Germany and Russia in 1940.
Nevertheless, Stalin was wise enough
to remain wary of his sinister
neighbors to the West.
Stalin's overall military strategy
required the expansion of Soviet territory to create a deep
barrier of Russian held territory between the Soviet union
and Nazi Germany.
It was this consideration which had led Stalin
to collaborate with Hitler in the invasion of Poland.
Ironically, the secret negotiations
instigated by Germany had also
granted Stalin the freehand in the Baltic and Finland,
which had precipitated the winter war,
which the Fins were now so keen to avenge.
From behind this defensive wall
Stalin planed to allow the Western allies
and Germany to fight a mutually destructive war in the West,
as they had done for four years during the great war.
(series of distant explosions)
(ominous music)
The early war Russian fighters were already obsolete.
Aircraft such as the Polikarpov I153
a lumbering biplane,
and the Polikarpov I16 known as the ratter were easily
outclassed by the new generation of German fighters.
These included the German Messerschmitt 109 fighters,
which were faster and more maneuverable than anything
the Russians could throw against them.
(loud boom)
(ominous music)
At last, at 04:00 on the 22nd of June, 1941,
the code word "Dortmund" crackled down the wires
and the full force of operation Barbarossa,
Germany's invasion of Soviet Russia, was unleashed.
(airplane roars)
(loud explosion)
AS they had come to expect
the German army sliced through
the opposition on the way to Leningrad.
Faced by the result of his own failures
in military matters, Stalin panicked.
While his army headquarters desperately
tried to piece together the most rudimentary
picture of what was happening,
he ordered an immediate counter offensive on all fronts.
As the first reports of the devastation
he had helped to create filtered through,
he was close to breaking point.
"All that Lennon created, we have lost forever",
he declared, before retreating to his dacha not to emerge
until the 3rd of July.
What really stunned the Red Army commanders was that this
massive German assault had proceeded long after it had left
its artillery support behind.
The Red Army command had planned
for conventional meeting engagements and frontline battles.
The perceived wisdom was that these would develop
over days or even weeks.
Next would come a large series of complex engagements.
And then the real war would begin.
In reality, using the new Blitzkrieg tactics,
the German advance was so swift that within hours of
the launch of Barbarossa
tank columns from Panzer Group IV were
approaching Riga some 50 miles behind the front.
This extended Blitzkrieg technique,
especially the bold use of armor came as an extraordinary
and disorientating surprise to the Russians,
even to the senior Soviet commanders.
Within 48 hours,
general staff reports made it perfectly plain,
that they had lost control of the situation.
They were in complete chaos,
and many did not know where their troops were
or what was happening.
They certainly did not have accurate reports of German
movements, and there was no real intelligence.
So they were not even sure
where the German thrusts were aimed.
All that they did know was that in the Northwest,
there was total collapse.
In consequence, Stalin operated his usual practice.
He had most of the front commanders arrested and then shot
as a consequence of the confusion
which raged throughout the army,
many of the Red Army divisions simply broke up
and formed very large pockets
of leaderless troops.
Passing these groups
of disorientated men, Von Leeb's Army Group North
scythed into the Baltic States, capturing Riga,
the Latvian capital.
(suspenseful music)
(loud explosion)
The number of prisoners taken and the war material captured
or destroyed in operation Barbarossa
was assuming astronomical proportions.
It is hardly surprising that Hitler, his commanders
and the troops themselves
now believed that the Red Army
must be nearing the end of its resources,
both in manpower and in weapons.
Prisoners confess that the German attack
had been completely unexpected.
Moscow, it seemed, was certain to fall into German hands.
Great optimism prevailed in Army Group Center.
Hitler had already set up a special engineer command
whose task was to be the demolition of the Kremlin.
The propaganda ministry saw fit to make a bombastic
statement announcing that the war in the East was won
and the Red Army practically annihilated.
(German leader gives speech)
During the early stages of the campaign,
the Stuka dive bombers of Luftflotte One
played their familiar role
as the German storm broke against Russia.
The initial moves followed the classic Blitzkrieg pattern,
no declaration of war and a fast moving assault
designed to disorientate and confuse the Russian army.
As the forces of Army Group North drove further
into the Baltic States,
Latvia and Estonia were quickly captured.
These lightning advances were greeted
with joy by the citizens of cities like Riga,
where the population viewed the German armies as liberators.
In scenes of unprompted joy,
the German soldiers were greeted with flowers and kisses
from the local girls.
A great deal of the Naval effort throughout the campaign
lay in suppressing Soviet Naval activity
by laying thousands of mines,
a task, which continued
even in the face of fierce air resistance.
(rapid gunfire)
These ships of Carl's battle group
continued with the task
of mine laying, despite the attentions of the red air force.
On land, the presence of a strong armored force
in the form of Panzer Group IV
gave Army Group North some much needed tank support
during the headlong advance into Russia.
Nevertheless, the rudimentary road system
of the Baltic States
and Northern Russia played havoc with the tanks.
Right at the beginning of the Russian campaign,
the Germans experienced the problems which dust can cause
in motor vehicles.
Tanks sustained severe damage from the dust
they stirred up while crossing vast sandy regions,
many tanks had no dust filters and on those which were
equipped, the filters soon became thoroughly clogged.
Quartz dust was sucked into engines,
which became so ground out that many tanks were rendered
unserviceable, in other tanks,
the abrasive action of dust reduced engine efficiency
and massively increased fuel consumption.
The sand roads undoubtedly caused problems.
They greatly slowed tanks or trucks.
They also caused huge dust clouds,
which were raised by convoys.
These dust clouds frequently provoked air attacks
by the surviving aircraft of the red air force.
As the red air force re-gathered its strength,
these attacks resulted in serious losses of men,
vehicles and horses.
For as long as they were in support of Army Group North,
the tanks of Panzer Group IV played an invaluable role,
but even with the Panzers,
the swift advances of June and July ground to a halt against
the tough defenses of the Stalin line,
which were encountered in August and early September.
While the fortifications of the frontier districts left much
to be desired,
there were still extensive fortifications to be overcome
deep within mother Russia.
Although they did not form a solid unbroken line
of fortifications, like the French Maggiano line,
the heavily defended Stalin line or the Leningrad line
as the German forces in the North knew it,
was a formidable series of prepared defenses.
Areas of great importance were
surrounded with heavy fortifications and the German armored
units driving for Leningrad encountered fortification
systems up to six miles in depth,
including well-positioned earth and concrete bunkers
with built-in guns and other heavy weapons.
There were also concrete pillboxes with disappearing
armored cupolas for artillery and machine guns.
A speedy elimination of these strong defenses with the means
available to a force designed for mobile warfare
was extremely difficult.
(suspenseful music)
The area of Krasnogvardeysk,
South of Leningrad, had been developed
according to sound soviet defensive principles,
and was effectively turned into an outlying fortress
for the defensive Leningrad.
During early September, 1941
it presented great difficulties
to the advance of the German forces.
Krasnogvardeysk blocked all highways and railroads leading
to Leningrad from the South
and constituted the main bulwark of Russian resistance.
The Russians defended it persistently.
Repeated attacks by several
infantry divisions were repulsed.
It was only taken in the course of a general attack
on the Leningrad line
and after bitter pillbox fighting in the area
immediately surrounding Krasnogvardeysk.
(suspenseful music)
Only the flexible leadership of battle-tested armored forces
attacking with great vigor
made it possible to overcome the defense zones
which had been set up with a sound knowledge
of the latest defense techniques.
Within a week, the German sixth Panzer division
had been forced to break
through and roll up 12 positions, repel several
counter attacks and take
more than 300 heavily fortified bunkers.
Like all German operations in Russia
from an early stage, it became apparent to the commanders,
to the troops,
to the high command that the task they had taken on and the
tasks they may have to take on were beginning to exceed
by far, the resources to hand.
In general terms,
the forces were adequate for the immediate tasks
which Army Group North had to fulfill.
It was a very accomplished command
and it did manage to achieve what Hitler ordered to be done,
which was to seize the Baltic States,
establishing them as a base for further operations in Russia
and move right up to Leningrad.
From October, 1941 onwards,
Hitler tended to vacillate between striking
into the Ukraine as the main strategic objective
and attacking Moscow,
which was the nerve center of Soviet Russia.
Army Group North therefore
came a poor third in terms of allocation of resources.
It is fair to suggest that Hitler's high command
failed to provide Von Leeb with enough resources,
which in turn prevented Army Group North from achieving
its objective of the capture of Leningrad.
(series of loud explosions)
In the North,
the fighting for the Stalin line
proved to be an attritional nightmare
with German casualties soon mounting
to first world war levels.
The Russians were very adept at preparing
inhabited places for defense.
In a short time,
a village would be converted into a little fortress.
Wooden houses had well camouflaged gun ports
almost flush with the floor.
Their interiors were reinforced with sandbags or earth.
Observation slots were cut into roofs and bunkers built into
floors and connected with adjacent houses or outside
defenses by narrow trenches.
(suspenseful music)
Although almost all inhabited places
were crammed with troops,
they seem deserted to German reconnaissance since even water
and food details were allowed to leave
their shelters only after dark.
(large explosion)
The Russians blocked approach routes with well camouflaged
anti-tank guns or dug-in tanks.
Wrecks of knocked out tanks were specially favored
for use as observation posts.
And as in placements for heavy infantry weapons
and bunkers for living quarters were dug under them.
Permanent structures destroyed by artillery fire,
or aerial bombs were utilized as defense points,
the ruins hid weapons and served to strengthen
the underlying bunkers.
Even the heaviest shelling would not drive the Russians
from these positions.
They could only be dislodged with hand grenades
or flame throwers in costly hand-to-hand fighting.
The Russians when they did retreat
frequently burned or blasted building suitable for housing
command posts or other important military installations.
Quite often, however, they left castles,
former country seats and other spacious dwellings intact,
but only after they had mined the walls in a completely
inconspicuous manner with delayed action bombs,
which were often set to explode several weeks later.
These were meant to blow up entire German headquarters
at one time.
The possible presence of time bombs in cities,
railroad stations, bridges,
and other important structures always had to be taken into
account in German thinking,
exacting a great psychological toll.
(distant explosions)
Entirely new to the Germans was the Russian use of forest
fires as a hot weather weapon.
In mid-summer when the trees
were tinder dry,
the Russians attempted to delay German forces advancing
on Leningrad by putting forests to the torch.
Not only the physical,
but the psychological impact of such fires was severe.
The crackling of the burning trees,
the acrid gray black smoke,
the increasingly unbearable heat and the feeling
of uncertainty put troops under a severe strain.
Despite the tenacity of a hard fought series of grueling
battles in which the SS police division particularly
distinguished itself, the Stalin line
was finally broken in late August
and Army Group North surged onwards.
(ominous music)
On the Baltic front, Von Leeb's Army Group North
had captured the city of Novgorod,
a vital target in the approach to Leningrad.
The beleaguered defenders of Novgorod
had fought to the death.
But this resistance too had been in vain.
The Germans had discovered the city's defensive plans
on the corpse of a Soviet officer.
With the Stalin line broken
general Hoepner's fourth Panzer group resumed its drive
toward Leningrad, but without supporting infantry
its progress was limited.
(ominous music)
Leningrad was a vital center of the wartime production
industry and reserves and equipment were poured
into the defense of the city.
As the Germans approached,
the citizens now formed into militia divisions of which
were flung against the Germans more in despair than hope.
Following a basic training period, averaging 16 hours,
the first militia divisions were sent to the front only six
days after being formed.
The second division marched to the front only two days after
its establishment and the third,
the same day it was established.
(series of explosions)
(large explosion)
Nonetheless, some Russian civilians
obviously felt caught between two fires,
one senior Soviet officer
later summed up the choices available.
He declared, "We were faced with a choice
between two dictators Hitler on the one hand
and Stalin on the other.
But we prefer to pick the one who spoke Russian."
(ominous music)
An ominous development for the Germans at this point
was the appearance on the battlefield
of the Russian medium T34 tank and the heavy KV 1.
Both of these machines were clearly superior to the German
tanks and were all but impervious
to most German anti-tank weapons,
especially the puny 37 millimeter anti-tank gun,
which was then the main German anti-tank weapon.
The 37 millimeter was so ineffective against Soviet armor
that it was nicknamed "the door knocker" by the disgruntled
German anti-tank gunners.
These puny 37 millimeter guns were intended to deal
with some of the best armor in the world.
General Erhard Raus who fought with Army Group North
left a clear account of the first encounter
with the new Russian armor
in the shape of the trusty KV1 tanks,
which attacked the third Panzer division.
"Then there suddenly appeared for the first time a battalion
of heavy enemy tanks of previously unknown type.
The tanks overran the armored infantry regiment and broke
through into the artillery position.
The projectiles of all defense weapons bounced off the thick
enemy armor, 100 German tanks were unable to check the 20
Russian dreadnoughts and suffered losses.
Several Czech built tanks,
which are bogged down in the grain fields because of
mechanical trouble were flattened by the enemy monsters.
The same fate befell a 150 millimeter
medium Howitzer battery,
which kept on firing until the last minute.
Despite the fact that it scored numerous direct hits from as
close a range as 200 yards, it's heavy shells
were unable to put even a single rank out of action.
The situation became critical.
Only the 88 millimeter flak finally knocked out a few
of the Russian KV1s
and forced the others to withdraw into the woods."
(suspenseful music)
The only bright sign for the Wehrmacht was that the new
Russian tanks were still in relatively short supply
and their battle drill was poor.
Once the scattered formations have been dealt with the road
to Leningrad lay open again.
(gun blasts)
Despite the limitations of some of its weaponry,
by September, Army Group North
had destroyed for all practical purposes,
the Soviet Northwest front,
it had virtually eliminated two Russian armies
driven to the outskirts of Leningrad.
The collapse of the Northwestern front was a real
catastrophe for the Red Army and brought Stalin
to the brink of despair.
Leningrad's fate hung by a thread
at the beginning of September,
but Stalin was to make one inspired move.
He appointed Marshal Zhukov to the command of Leningrad.
And this remarkable soldier
was to prove himself equal to the task.
(suspenseful music)
As Army Group North drove headlong towards Leningrad,
a further huge haul of confused Russian prisoners was taken
in the Baltic States and a large body of Russian troops was
isolated in what became known as the Oranienbaum pocket
on the Baltic coast to the West of Leningrad.
The Oranienbaum pocket was a small semicircle
of Russian held territory,
an area of ground that was never to be taken
by army group North,
despite all attempts over the next three years.
And it was to prove a tactical thorn
in the side of the 18th army.
When the 18th army in Panzer Group IV
burst into the Leningrad area in September, 1941,
they swept forward at high speed
and as they moved swiftly North,
they either destroyed or brushed aside the Soviet armies.
One tiny element of the Soviet eighth army,
which had suffered catastrophically from the attack
was pushed right up to the coast.
There, around the town of Oranienbaum,
three elements of the eighth army kept up resistance
for virtually three years.
The bridge had acquired enormous strategic significance.
(suspenseful music)
The Oranienbaum area enabled the Russians
to protect the Island of Kronstadt.
This Island was vital to the Naval base directly
to the West of Leningrad.
It enabled the Soviet forces in the region,
both Naval and military, to prevent the German forces
of army group North completely denying
Leningrad the resources which enabled it to survive
the subsequent siege of Leningrad.
(suspenseful music)
On September the fourth, 1941
senior lieutenant Dariusz of the first Panzer regiment
radioed back to headquarters
that his unit had reached Leningrad.
Other units from the 18th army pressed on to capture
Shlisselburg to the East of Leningrad.
With the arrival of the rest of the 18th army
to reinforce the Panzers, on the 8th of September,
the German stranglehold
on the city of Leningrad tightened further.
The capture of Shlisselburg to the East
signaled the end of rail transport.
The German invaders surged on as far as Tikvin
deep inside the Russian hinterland.
Despite the best efforts of the population,
the first shells began to rain down
on Leningrad early in September.
It marked the beginning of a crucial episode in the war.
The Epic siege of the city, which would last for 900 days.
(suspenseful music)
(loud explosion)
(ominous music)
As the German advance into Northern Russia continued
the rail link to Leningrad was cut.
The fate of Leningrad and with it,
30 Russian divisions appeared to be sealed.
The next stage of the battle was expected to be an attack
on the beleaguered city.
(weapon blasts)
(distant gunfire)
Contrary to their own expectations
the men of the German 18th army were not to be asked
to mount a full-scale attack on the city.
And after a series of hotly contested battles
for the outskirts,
Hitler uncharacteristically ordered his troops to take
Leningrad by means of a long drawn out siege.
It has been suggested that he was unnerved
by the remote controlled explosions,
which the Russians had used so effectively in Kiev.
It is a decision which still provokes debate today.
There are really two possible explanations for the failure
of Army Group North to take Leningrad.
One was the conflicting priorities in the mind
of Adolf Hitler and the army high command.
Hitler vacillated between
prioritizing a number of objectives.
There is also a school of thought
which favors Hitler's adverse reaction to the huge losses
of the German sixth army in Kiev in August and September.
In Kiev, thousands of German troops
were lost to remote controlled explosions
and thousands of others to desperate street fighting.
This, it is thought,
persuaded Hitler that no German troops should
be made vulnerable by committing them to the inner city
streets of Moscow and Leningrad.
In any event,
the 18th army lacked the really heavy artillery necessary
to reduce the defenses of Leningrad.
The massive guns of the German siege train had already been
allocated to the sector of Army Group South,
where they were earmarked for the coming battles
in the Crimea.
To move them all the way across Russia
would have delayed the operation into winter.
To compound the problems of the battles
for the attackers, Panzer group four
was withdrawn from Army Group North in late September, 1941
in order to support Army Group Center in operation Typhoon,
the final drive on Moscow.
No German Army Group could afford to lose its tanks,
but Army Group North lost virtually all of its armor.
The withdrawal of the tanks from Army Group North
meant that the army was virtually immobile.
It was to remain so for almost three years.
(rapid gunfire)
(loud boom)
(weapon blasts)
It is easy to suggest that the loss of Panzer Group four
in September, 1941
was directly responsible for the failure
of Army Group North to take its strategic
objective of Leningrad.
However, this is by no means certain.
The capture of a city as large
and well defended as Leningrad was by no means certain,
even with a strong armored force.
Nevertheless, the removal of Panzer Group four
clearly did not help the cause of Army Group North.
It meant that Army Group North would be denied this one
formation and the size, speed and fighting power to advance
quickly into the regions beyond the city of Leningrad,
link up with the Fins and effectively cut off
the city from its supplies.
The disappearance of Panzer Group four proved to be
a forerunner of things to come.
From that point onwards,
the evidence was clear that of the three German army groups
Army Group North was considered to be the poor relation.
It soon became obvious that they could expect to receive no
substantial additional support of any kind.
And the artillery siege train
would never be sent to Leningrad.
The 18th army, therefore, had no alternative,
but to take Leningrad by siege.
It seemed that the decisive battles on the Eastern front
would be fought elsewhere.
(suspenseful music)
(loud blast)
(weapon blast)
With the commencement of the siege of Leningrad,
a relatively stable frontline
appeared in the Northern sector.
The 16th army fought on the right flank
of the Northern sector,
where it was adjacent to the left wing of Army Group Center.
The 18th Army fought on the left flank
of the 16th army and as such
formed the extreme Northern end of the front line.
Army Group North was to remain doggedly committed
to the Northern flank
of the German armies fighting on the Eastern front
for the entire duration of the war.
(distant explosions)
(weapon blasts)
(rapid gunfire)
The siege of Leningrad was the stage for an intense struggle
that would in later years be recognized as a key event
in that conflict of inhuman savagery.
The opening stages were bitterly fought
in the suburbs of the city.
(weapon blasts)
(ominous music)
(people chattering)
When general Zhukov arrived to take over the defense
of the city on the 10th of September, 1941,
he found the defenders in an advanced state
of disorganization and the inhabitants close to panic.
Undaunted, he briskly set about bolstering its defenses.
A shortage of anti-tank guns was dealt with by converting
anti-aircraft artillery to the task
of attempting to halt the Panzers.
Six brigades of Naval infantry and students were
formed and reinforcements drafted in
from the Karelian Isthmus.
Zhukov began to take the fight to the Germans
through raids and counter attacks.
But by now the German troops had pierced the inner circle
of defenses and were rampaging through the suburbs.
(rapid gunfire)
After a furious exchange of advances and retreats,
by the end of the month,
the defenders were hanging onto their city
by their fingernails.
It seemed inevitable that Leningrad would capitulate,
but as Zhukov awaited a renewed assault,
the fourth Panzer group suddenly departed
to join the battle for Moscow
and the remaining German forces began to build defenses.
Hitler had decreed that Leningrad
would not be taken by force.
It would instead be starved into submission,
but there was a flaw in the plan.
Although the supply situation was difficult,
without Panzer Group four
the ring around the city was never completely closed.
It was still possible to reach the city over land through
the Virgin forests of the Russian motherland.
It was also possible to bring in supplies by boat,
across the waters of Lake Lagoda.
In October, there was some temporary relief
for the defenders.
The roads had disintegrated into canals of bottomless mud
along which wheeled vehicles could drive only at a snail's
pace and only if they were towed by tanks.
This was the "rasputitsa", the season of mud,
which came as a debilitating surprise
to the Germans in 1941,
general Raus went to great lengths after the war to explain
the great significance of the muddy season.
"German losses of tanks and motorized equipment of all types
were extraordinarily high during the autumn
muddy period of 1941.
The first time that the mud of Russia was encountered a
division of the fourth Panzer group operating in the area
North of Gzhatsk, during the same period,
lost 50 tanks without a shot being fired.
35 of them within three days,
these losses were extremely serious since no
replacements were received."
The Germans had no conception of mud as it exists
in European Russia.
In the autumn of 1941,
when frontline troops were already stuck fast,
the German high command still believed that mud could be
conquered by brute force.
An idea that led to serious losses
of vehicles and equipment.
At the height of the muddy season,
tractors and recovery vehicles normally capable
of traversing difficult terrain are helpless,
and attempts to plow through the muddy mass
makes roads even more impassable.
Tanks, heavy recovery vehicles,
and even vehicles with good ground clearance
simply pushed an ever-growing wall of mud before them,
until they finally stopped half buried by their own motion.
A sudden frost in the autumn of 1941,
cemented a crippled buried column
into a state of complete uselessness.
And it never moved again.
Because it could not be reached in any other way,
gasoline, tow ropes and food supplies were airdropped along
the line of stranded armor,
but all attempts to move, were futile.
Often when drivers found themselves bogged down
far from any habitation,
they abandoned their vehicles and set out on foot to contact
friendly troops in the nearest village
or sought food and shelter
from local civilians in order to remain alive until
the worst of the muddy season passed.
For the muddy seasons, vehicles with high ground clearance,
lightweight and low unit ground pressure were necessary.
German trucks had low ground clearance and could not get
traction in deep mud.
Since German supply cars had wheels too narrow for muddy
terrain, they sank deep into soft ground.
Even the German Maultier and Ost schlepper
of the later years were bogged down in mud
as their tracks were too narrow.
Raus noted that the awkward looking
and slow Russian tractor of pre-war vintage
salvaged the heaviest most deeply mired loads
after German equipment failed to budge them.
Inside Leningrad, food supplies to the besieged city
had been diminishing throughout the autumn.
By late November,
they were at their lowest ebb for the entire duration
of the siege.
Manual workers were receiving
only 250 grams of bread per day.
One third of their normal requirement.
Without water for sanitation
and basic medical supplies,
disease became inevitable.
As winter arrived and temperatures
fell to the minus twenties,
thousands began to die each day.
Total starvation threatened constantly.
To the Germans
collapse seemed imminent.
Back in Berlin, a reception with Adolf Hitler
as a guest of honor,
was organized to celebrate the fall of the stricken city.
The invitations were printed, but never posted.
Russian resistance remained stubborn and defiant.
Even women soldiers in the Red Army were in combat units,
the ferocity and inhumanity of the conflict
beggars the imagination.
(engine rumbles)
In an attempt to relieve the appalling conditions
in the city, the Russians marked a road
across the frozen Southwest corner of Lake Ladoga.
And by the 22nd of November, convoys of supply lorries
were just managing to stave off famine in the city.
It was a hazardous passage through the biting Northeastern
gales, which swept across the Lake.
The German Luftwaffe also did its best
to intercept the convoys and break the surface of the ice.
Yet for all its horror,
the Russians knew that defending this lifeline to the city
was the only possible way of keeping the inhabitants alive.
(airplane roars past)
(quick succession of blasts)
But for some,
the food coming across the ice was too little too late.
Victims of starvation, suffering from falling blood pressure
and the wasting of the heart and internal organs would never
regain their health.
Many would die months after food
and medical supplies finally arrived.
The children who survived would emerge totally traumatized
by the siege as an eyewitness recalled.
"It was reflected in the way many of the children played all
by themselves in the way that even in that collective games,
they played in silence with grave faces.
I saw faces of children,
which reflected such thoughtfulness and sorrow that those
eyes and faces told one more than could be gathered from all
the stories of the horrors of famine."
As events unfolded it soon became clear that in spite of all
the hardships of the siege of Leningrad,
the Northern sector was considered by both sides
to be of secondary importance.
The men of Army Group North
soon became convinced that they were fighting
what they referred to as, "the eternal war of the poor man".
Casualties along the whole of the Russian front
had been enormous,
but only 67,000 replacements were allocated
to army group North
as against 131,000 to Army Group Center
and 119,000 to Army Group South.
When it came to allocating fresh divisions
from the reserves, the situation
was even less favorable.
Of 21 new divisions released
by army high command in the autumn of 1941,
only three were allocated to Army Group North.
It was a further indication of things to come.
One unexpected benefit for the Army Group was the occasional
support which they received from German Naval units
operating in the Baltic.
As one flank rested on the Baltic seas
Army Group North was the only formation which could
look for substantial support from the Kriegsmarine.
The German Navy had played a significant role
in the Soviet German war.
In the Baltic,
the Germans sealed up
the powerful Russian front with minefields.
By doing so,
they also trapped the Soviet submarine fleet.
As the Germans advanced along the Baltic coastline,
they took control of Russian bases so that the Soviet Baltic
fleet had to remain bottled up in Leningrad.
The function of the Soviet Baltic fleet during 1941 and 42
was limited solely to supplying fire support to the Soviet
forces fighting to defend the city.
This aspect of the fighting was also to provide the stage
for a daring attack led by the Stukas of Hans-Ulrich Rudel.
The Luftwaffe was ordered
to sink the Soviet battleship Marat.
Rudel managed this amazing feat in the face of fierce
anti-aircraft fire with a single well-placed bomb.
(waves crashing)
On the deficit side,
the 18th army had to become involved in a number
of amphibious operations to capture the Baltic islands,
which placed a great strain on what were already
severely limited resources.
(weapon blasts)
(deep boom)
(fire crackles)
Throughout the whole course of the war,
the lack of powerful reinforcements severely limited
the strategic options available for the Army Group command.
It also required a great deal of juggling of available
divisions to maintain the extended frontline and the siege
of Leningrad, which was to drag on for almost three years.
(people chattering)
The Germans had closed right up on the city
and into the outer suburbs, but the ring was not closed.
An important consideration
at this time was the role of the Fins.
They agreed to move close to Leningrad, their fifth general
Mannerheim making it quite clear that he was prepared
to take action to recover Finnish territory,
yielded to Russia in the winter war of 1939,
but that he would not take part in the direct attack
on Leningrad itself.
(gentle guitar music)
That was one of the conditions Finland made
on entering the war against Russia
on the side of the Germans.
Mannerheim was as mindful
of the political conditions as he was
of the military conditions because of Finland's
vulnerability to future Russian aggression.
This meant that the German and Finnish armies were never
able to cut off Leningrad completely
from the rest of the world.
In both winter and summer,
the Russian forces were still able to get resources across
Lake Ladoga in the Northeast of the city.
From the winter of 1942 onwards,
the railway to the East of Leningrad was completed
and Leningrad was connected to the rest of the Soviet union,
which enabled the forces to supply the inhabitants
of the city, helping some of them to survive the siege.
The Soviet negotiators in the Soviet Finnish peace talks,
which took place in 1944,
actually recalled that the Russians recognized what the Fins
had done for them.
If the Fins had moved forward and closed the ring of siege
around Leningrad, it would've meant the death of the city.
Despite the fact that some supplies
got through, it was precious little.
Starvation drove the population to extreme measures,
including the horrifying excess of cannibalism.
The first cases occurred at the beginning of December, 1941.
The Soviet criminal code
made no mention of such a crime as cannibalism.
So Soviet officials could at first only define it as an
extreme form of banditry.
According to the top secret report of the military
procurator of Leningrad, A. A Kuznetsov,
dated 27th of February, 1942
investigations of cannibalism led to criminal charges
against 26 individuals in December, 1941,
366 in January, 1942 and 494
in the first two weeks of February, 1942.
Investigation revealed that not only was human flesh
consumed by individuals,
but it was also sold to other citizens.
By the 20th of February 1942, 866 individuals were under
criminal investigation or actual indictment
for suspected cannibalism.
Only 18% of this number had any previous criminal record.
Of the 886 suspect individuals, 322 were men
and 564 women.
Almost 30% were aged over 40.
The next largest group being in their thirties.
More ghoulish still,
was the discovery of extensive intrusions
into cemeteries and the mutilation of the recent dead.
One evening in March, 1942,
the watchman at the Piskaryovskoye cemetery detained a woman
with a sack.
Once opened, the sack revealed the bodies of five infants.
The increase in cannibalism forced the city authorities
to set up police guards at all the major cemeteries.
With the first snows of 1941 came a cruelly bitter winter.
The temperature continued to fall and the German soldiers
now paid dearly for the arrogance of the high command
that had refused to admit the possibility of anything other
than a quick decisive campaign.
Few men in the German trenches had more than summer clothing
and frostbite took an agonizing tole.
German machinery and guns had never been designed
to function in such extremes.
Engines seized up, metal tank tracks split apart
in the cold, ammunition would not fire.
The fierceness of the cold
was far beyond the experience of most Germans.
(tank roars past)
(distant explosions)
Emboldened by the problems they saw in the German ranks
a series of Soviet counterattacks managed to roll back
many of the German gains around Leningrad.
With incredible exertions,
the Germans kept up a semblance of defense.
The tactics of winter warfare centered around contests
for the possession of roads and inhabited places.
In Russia, villages and roads
were infinitely more important than they
were on the rest of the continent.
In other German theaters of war,
no one particular road ever became a crucial factor
since a well-developed road network
always offered a choice of alternate routes.
In Russia, the possession of a single road
was often a matter of life
or death for an entire army.
The extreme tactical importance of inhabited places during
the six months of winter explains the fact that the Russians
would frequently much rather destroy them than surrender
them to the enemy.
In the bitter trench warfare outside Leningrad,
the defender had a definite advantage in winter
because as a rule,
their positions could not be seen in the snow,
except at very close range.
The defenders were able to keep their forces undercover
and wait until the moment their fire
could be used most effectively.
The attacker was also impeded and easily detected
even in camouflaged clothing.
The principal weapon of the defender became the machine gun
as its performance was not diminished by snow
in which mortars and light artillery lost
most of their effectiveness.
Replacements were also becoming a problem
for the German forces.
After the war,
it became clear from the diaries of Army Group North
that the commanders of both formations had intentionally
prohibited, even during calm periods,
the removal of a unit from the front in order to grant it
a period of rest.
It was better to keep the divisions at the front and assign
them to a narrower sector
as otherwise a reserve unit,
which had been removed from the Northern front was certain
to be taken by the Supreme command and assigned more
pressing pressure points on either the central
or the Southern front.
(distant gunfire)
(loud explosion)
Although the Northern front was regarded as being
of secondary importance, it was in no sense, a backwater.
There was still a great deal of terrible fighting in very
difficult terrain with extensive swamps and few roads
through the vast sections of trackless forest,
which presented a logistical nightmare.
Army group North and the army divisions were facing the most
difficult conditions on the Eastern front.
The climate and the terrain were completely different.
Around Leningrad, it is very marshy and boggy.
There were also very few roads.
So all transport logistics were very difficult indeed.
To compound the difficulties for the Germans,
by October of 1941,
the first partisan attacks had begun to cause severe
difficulties in the rear areas.
The effects of these attacks were further compounded
by the fact that the underdeveloped
infrastructure of Russia
meant that there were very few roads or railways
which could be used as alternatives
to those blocked by partisan activity.
The Russian winter was a nightmare
along the whole of the front,
but it was Army Group North
which bore the brunt of the most extreme Russian winters.
It is impossible to exaggerate the cruel realities
of fighting in the ferocious winters of Northern Russia.
In addition to their geographical
and climactic difficulties,
the fighting spirit of the Red Army facing Army Group North
was no less intense
than that displayed on the other sectors.
The siege of Leningrad has become synonymous
with endurance and suffering,
but there was also a great deal of intense combat
as a series of miniature battles rolled
backwards and forwards
around the siege lines outside Leningrad.
(weapon blasts)
(distant gunfire)
(weapon blasts)
Despite coming very close to victory
on a number of occasions,
Army Group North was never able to close the ring
around Leningrad completely.
And the high command continued to draw desperately needed
divisions away from the Army Group North sector,
in order to feed other hard-pressed sectors.
The result of this attrition from two directions
was that a ferocious Soviet offensive in January, 1944,
finally broke the resistance
of Army Group North and raised the siege.
The lifting of the siege of Leningrad in 1944
forced Army Group North
to fall back to a new defensive front
composed of a series of partially constructed
defenses known as "The Panther line".
This line should have represented a fallback position
for the German forces, but work was beginning much too late.
The Panther line was envisaged as a series of strong
fortifications incorporating parts of the Northern regions
of the Soviet union in a line running Southwards
from Lake Dvina and Lake Pscov
near the town of Nava
on the Baltic coast of Estonia.
It was envisaged that the German troops
retreating behind the line
would occupy a series of excellent defensive points.
The German troops would therefore have a respite
from the rigors of the retreat
and be able to hold the Soviet army at bay.
Meanwhile, the armored formations
and the air formations of the German army
were repaired and returned to the fray to renew combat
with their Soviet foes.
However, the Panther line
was constructed merely as an afterthought
when it was much too late.
The German armies had suffered defeats
and simply did not have
enough troops to man the line effectively.
In those areas where adequate defenses
had been prepared in the line
and there were sufficient German troops
and aircraft available,
it proved a very formidable obstacle
for the Soviet army to overcome.
Had it been properly prepared
as part of a coherent overall strategic plan,
the Panther line could have been held.
(suspenseful music)
The Panther line was only ever going to provide a temporary
solution to the mounting problems of Army Group North.
The destruction of the neighboring Army Group Center
in June, 1944,
tore a huge gap in the German lines and left the right flank
of Army Group North vulnerable to a Soviet attack.
Hitler was forced to sanction another series of withdrawals.
From the Panther line, Army Group North
were forced to retreat in relatively good order
towards Germany fighting a series of ferocious defensive
battles as they went.
The most notable of these being
the defense of Nava in 1944.
The battle for Narva plays a very important part
in the Soviet German war
because Narva is the gateway to Estonia.
The Germans recognized the importance of holding Narva.
And there were initially 12 divisions organized
into what was called "Abteilung Narwa",
a special force grouping,
which was to fight with enormous courage and distinction.
The defense of Narva was a bitterly fought encounter.
A breakthrough here would have compromised
many German troops in the Baltic regions
of Estonia and Latvia.
European SS, along with the German
regular army divisions managed to hold
back the forces of the Soviet Leningrad front
throughout January, February, and March.
Their bitter attritional contest was not characterized
by sophisticated tactical maneuvers.
It was a bloody slugging-match.
(distant gunfire)
(weapon blasts)
The German formations were saved by the early spring thaw
of late March, 1944,
which produced seas of mud floods of at least one foot deep
in an area of 100 to 140 miles square.
Even Soviet tanks stuck fast in the torrents of mud
and the German forces were able to retreat once more.
The incredible resistance offered by Army Group Narva,
a scratch formation drawn from the slender resources
of Army Group North
represents an impressive example
of military improvisation
and stands comparison with the other
German defensive battles fought elsewhere
in Russia and Italy.
The mainstay of resistance in Narva was the third SS Panzer
Corps, which included the long serving SS police division
along with the new SS Viking division
comprised of volunteers from different nationalities.
(rapid gunfire)
By October, 1944,
the situation around Narva
from a German point of view, was hopeless.
But unlike the countless garrisons squandered by Hitler
in a pointless series of hold-at-all-costs orders,
Army Group Narva managed to escape
and rejoin Army Group North.
Constant retreat was now the order of the day as the army
group was driven back
through the Baltic States towards Germany.
But Army Group North would never make it home.
(gentle guitar music)
While the Red Army rolled on towards Berlin,
the men of Army Group North were finally cornered
in the Courland peninsula of Latvia.
There, the battered remnants
of the Army Group held off all attacks
by the Red Army for six long months.
They were under siege from late October,
1944 through to May, 1945.
(weapon blasts)
(rapid gunfire)
In January, 1945, the two armies,
which had served since 1941 as Army Group North
were renamed Army Group Courland.
The hard-won mantle of Army Group North
was transferred to a scratch assembly
of beaten units under the command
of a swift succession of temporary leaders.
The spirit of the men of Army Group North
remained behind in Courland.
(ominous music)
(distant blasts)
The German divisions,
which found their way to Courland
were stuck there.
They were blockaded by the Russians and there was nothing
they could do.
They could no longer make any useful contribution
to the greater course of the war elsewhere.
In many respects,
it was a very wasteful and irresponsible
gesture on the part of Hitler.
This albeit scratch army was still a considerable force,
which could have made a valuable contribution elsewhere,
but it was not to be made available.
(distant explosions)
Despite everything that the besieged Red Army
could throw at them,
the surviving elements of the 16th and 18th armies
now officially known as Army Group Courland
continued to resist all further attempts
to force them into surrender.
Fighting for the Courland peninsula was grinding in nature.
It was not like the Western and Eastern fronts
characterized by large formations,
sweeping along the frontier and impressive sophisticated
operations, in the Courland fighting, the Germans
trapped in this region were gradually, slowly
and surely pushed back
in spectacular fashion into something
of a geographical cul-de-sac by the Red Army.
(waves crashing)
They were well served to the bitter end by the ships
of the Kriegsmarine
who managed to evacuate some divisions
recalled to Germany.
On occasion, they even managed to bring in
some much needed reinforcements.
The German Navy did have an important role to play
when the Red Army began to advance
along the Baltic coast to break into East Prussia,
because if at all possible the German Navy
had to try and contain Soviet Naval operations.
Even more importantly,
they had a grievous burden,
to try and evacuate as many of the German civilians
and German military units
who had been trapped and transport them back
into German territory.
(suspenseful music)
(airplane roars past)
The Naval aspect in the closing stage of the war
does demonstrate that the German Navy
could operate well even in the face of disaster,
which was now pending.
The Kriegsmarine was absolutely vital in explaining why
German formations fought bitterly
to the end for the pointless
battle for the Courland peninsula.
The peninsula, from the Army's point of view
was militarily useless,
indeed many German commanders in late 1944 and spring 1945
constantly requested Hitler
to give up the Courland peninsula.
This would release the 26 divisions
that were fighting there
in order to bolster their defense in what
were more important military regions nearer to home.
(distant explosion)
(rapid gunfire)
The German Navy had used the Baltic sea throughout
World War Two as a training ground
for its submarine commanders.
Donitz, a committed Nazi
who was in charge of the Navy at this stage,
regarded the retention of the Gulf of Danzig in the Baltic
sea as essential in order to train his submarine commanders
to use the extremely powerful new submarine, the type 21,
which the German Navy were developing
towards the end of the war.
The Kriegsmarine therefore played a critical role in
explaining why the German formations fought so bitterly for
the Courland peninsula.
(weapon fires rapidly)
Trapped in Courland, the survivors
of the old Army Group North
maintained their cohesion and fighting ability
until the final surrender on may the eighth, 1945,
almost four years since they had first moved into Russia.
On that day 203,000 men began the long march
into Soviet captivity.
Many would never return.
And others were held as slave laborers until 1955,
a high price to pay for their long defense.
Of the three huge army groups which Hitler sent into Russia,
it could be argued that Army Group North was the most
successful in carrying out the tasks assigned to it.
Although the campaign ultimately ended in failure for them,
the men of Army Group North retained their military cohesion
with some units achieving the rare distinction of serving
for the whole four years
of the Russian war in the same army group.
(ominous music)