WEBVTT FILE

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Downloaded from
YTS.MX

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(ominous music)

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Official YIFY movies site:
YTS.MX

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(engine rumbles)

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(crowd cheers)

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(crowd cheers)

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(bell rings)

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(airplane roars past)

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(siren rings)

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(airplane roars)

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(loud explosions)

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(army marches)

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(siren rings)
(ominous boom)

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(suspenseful music)

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- [Narrator] This is the terrifying story

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of the titanic duel fought

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between the armies of Hitler
and Stalin in the bitter cold

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of an Arctic winter outside Leningrad.

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It was here that the men of
the German Army Group North

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fought and died with
the men of the Red Army.

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The German forces were so
constantly short of manpower

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and material, that they
christened the pitiless war

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they were fighting, "The
eternal war of the poor man".

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(series of explosions)

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The Russians too, had to
endure terrible hardship.

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And the siege of Leningrad
contains heartrending tales

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of suffering and heroism,

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but the Russian sacrifice was
ultimately to be vindicated.

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For the men of Army Group North

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there was to be no such satisfaction.

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Most were destined never
to return to Germany.

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The ceaseless demands of the
cruelest conflict in history

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would ultimately claim the
whole Army Group as its victim.

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(ominous music)

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In late 1940

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when Adolf Hitler finally
confirmed to the general staff

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that he had irrevocably
decided to attack Russia,

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a plan was swiftly
conceived by General Marcks

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which envisaged a two pronged
advance by two huge army

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groups totaling over 3,500,000 men.

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The German grand strategy

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was for two great parallel advances.

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The first aimed at Leningrad in the North,

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then swinging South to Moscow.

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And the second at Odesa on the black sea.

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(ominous music)

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During the winter of 1939,

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Finland had been involved in
an uneven struggle with Soviet

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Russia to protect her territory.

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Under the leadership of
field marshal Mannerheim

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the Fins had doggedly resisted

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the superior Russian forces,

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but ultimately had to yield

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valuable territory around Leningrad.

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Britain had refused to
help the Fins who in 1941,

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turned to Germany for aid in
regaining their lost territory.

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Hitler hoped to draw Finland

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into an offensive war with Russia,

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but the finish objective was
simply to address the balance,

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not the conquest of Russia.

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Although the Fins would play a small part

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in the battle for Leningrad,

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their refusal to mount an
invasion of Soviet territory

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would ultimately have dire
consequences for Hitler.

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(ominous music)

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Under the Marcks plan,

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elements of Army Group North,

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were to capture Leningrad,

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then drive North to link up with the Fins

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and eliminate all Russian forces

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in the Baltic region.

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Only then was Moscow to be attacked

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from the West and North simultaneously.

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(ominous music)

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From the very outset

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Hitler found it impossible to prioritize

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the objectives for his Russian campaign.

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After much discussion and argument,

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the Marcks plan was subsequently
revised to produce three

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separate army groups.

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Each aimed at a different objective.

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Army Group North was to capture Leningrad,

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Army Group Center was to capture Moscow

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and Army Group South was aimed at Odesa.

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With three major objectives to achieve

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it was clear from the
outset that German forces

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would be dangerously overstretched.

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Sections of the German military

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were very opposed to the venture,

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but Hitler refused to accept

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the advice of his staff officers.

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His gamblers instinct told
him that if he delayed

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even for one year,

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the crowds that cheered
the latest successes

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so fervently, might no longer
be willing to follow him into

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so hazardous an undertaking.

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And there was surely no
greater military adventure

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than the invasion of Russia.

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(ominous music)

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(building explodes)

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(loud boom)

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Following the spectacular
victories in Poland, Norway,

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France and the Balkans,

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the German forces assembled for
Barbarossa expected to fight

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a short campaign,

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which would secure their
victories throughout Europe.

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Hitler became convinced that
he could crush the Red Army

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as easily as he had
defeated his other enemies.

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In the spring of 1941

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field marshal von Rundstedt,

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who had spent most of the first world war

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on the Eastern front,
asked Hitler outright

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if he knew what it meant to invade Russia.

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The commander in chief,
field marshal von Brauchitsch

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and his chief of the
general staff general Halder

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also counseled Hitler
against the operation.

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It was all to no avail

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as Hitler simply refused
to heed their warnings.

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Field Marshall von Rundstedt,

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the commander of Army Group South

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was forthright in his views
on the forthcoming battle.

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"This war with Russia
is a nonsensical idea

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to which I can see no happy ending.

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But if for political reasons,

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the war is unavoidable,

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then we must face the
fact that it cannot be won

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in a single summer campaign.

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Just look at the distances involved.

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We cannot possibly defeat the
enemy and occupy the whole

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of Western Russia from the
Baltic to the black sea

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within a few short months.

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We should prepare for a long war

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and go for our objectives step by step.

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First of all,

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a strong Army Group North
should capture Leningrad

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and the area around it.

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This would enable us to
link up with the Fins,

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eliminate the red fleet
from the Baltic and increase

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our influence in Scandinavia.

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The central and Southern
army groups should

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for the time being

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advance only to align running Odesa, Kiev,

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Orsha, Lake Ilmen.

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Then if we have sufficient time this year

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Army Group North could advance Southeast

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from Leningrad towards Moscow
while Army Group Center

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move eastwards on the capital.

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All further operations should
be postponed until 1942,

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when we should make new
plans based on the situation

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as it then is."

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Had Hitler followed von
Rundstedt's good advice,

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the history of the Western
world may well have followed

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a very different pattern.

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Hitler, however, did have good grounds

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for rejecting the advice of his officers.

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(ominous music)

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While the German army in
the 1930s had been building

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its strength under Hitler,

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Stalin had been destroying
the Russian officer Corps.

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By the end of the purge,

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the Russian army had lost
three of the five remaining

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marshals of the Soviet union,

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all 11 deputy ministers of defense,

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75 of the 80 members
of the military Soviet,

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all the commanders of
the military districts,

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13 of the 15 army commanders,

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more than half the Corps commanders

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and approximately 30% of the officers

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below brigade level.

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Stalin had considered himself safe

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as he did not intend to become
involved in Western affairs.

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He had made complex peace treaties

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and alliances with both
Britain and Germany

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and hoped they would fight
a mutually destructive war

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in the West.

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(suspenseful music)

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Less than one year later, however,

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Stalin's hopes of a protracted
war between the Western

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powers and Hitler, evaporated
with the brilliant success

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of Hitler's Blitzkrieg tactics,
which saw Denmark, Norway,

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Holland, Belgium, and France
fall in rapid succession.

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The lightning campaign through
the Balkans in Greece in 1941

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could only produce more
grounds for disquiet.

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Though Stalin accepted
that war with Germany

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was now almost inevitable,

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he certainly did not expect
to be attacked in 1941.

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He decided Russia had at
least until the spring of 1942

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to prepare herself.

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His explosive denials of all contrary

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information was so fierce that
vital intelligence concerning

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German preparations was kept
from him by subordinates

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fearful of the violence of his temper.

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As the German buildup towards
operation Barbarossa continued

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Stalin's attempts to pacify
Hitler grew more desperate.

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He had already stated in
an interview with Pravda

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in November 1939,

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that it was not Germany who had
attacked Britain and France,

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but Britain and France
who had attacked Germany.

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Stalin now forbade

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any criticism of Germany to
be printed in the newspapers.

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In 1940, he increased Russian supplies

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to Germany and withdrew

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recognition of the Norwegian

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and Belgian governments in exile.

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In the following year

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when Hitler successfully invaded

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Greece and Yugoslavia,
Stalin quickly expelled

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the Yugoslavian ambassador

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to Moscow and refused a request

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to recognize the Greek
government in exile.

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Stalin felt he was continuing
to buy time with these

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unrequited concessions, but
his use of the breathing space,

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which he had already obtained
was totally devoid of any

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worthwhile attempt to remedy
his military disadvantages.

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(ominous music)

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(slow suspenseful music)

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The main Russian force charged
with defending Leningrad

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was the Northwest Front under Kuznetsov.

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In theory, the Russian forces

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were larger and more generously supplied

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with tanks, guns, and aircraft.

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In practice, the Red Army as a whole

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proved to be so demoralized by

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internal disruptions that they
were disastrously unprepared.

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In addition, much of the Russian equipment

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was obsolete or unserviceable

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with the result that in the
opening battles at least,

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there was to be no real contest.

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As a result of Stalin's purges,

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the Soviet forces were
less than equal to the task

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of combating a highly
professional, well organized army,

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which was accustomed to
success on the battlefield.

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(melancholy music)

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Many divisions where between
six to 7,000 men short

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of wartime establishment.

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Levies of experienced personnel
had been hived off to build

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new tank and aviation units.

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Only one of the six Soviet
mechanized Corps had received

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their full compliment of equipment.

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Three of the four motorized divisions

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had no tanks whatsoever.

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And four out of every five vehicles

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in the tank fleets were obsolete.

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Four of the Corps could only
deploy one quarter of their

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designated motor vehicles.

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And in another four Corps

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one in three motor
vehicles needed repairs.

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From even a cursory analysis,

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the Soviet Red Army and
the German Wehrmacht

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were anything but equal adversaries.

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(man speaks over radio)

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(loud explosions)

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In the Western part of Russia,

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the Red Army consisted
of about 5,000,000 men

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with 1,000,000 in the Leningrad sector.

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Although the tank strength of the Red Army

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on the 21st of June, 1941 was
an impressive 23,108 machines,

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only 8,000 were battle
ready and in good condition.

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Of these, less than 1200 were deployed

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in the Leningrad sector.

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Many of the Soviet tanks
where the outdated T26

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and T28 medium tanks,

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there were even a few of
the outdated T35 machines,

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00:15:13.940 --> 00:15:16.190
a massive multi turreted tank,

265
00:15:16.190 --> 00:15:19.023
which proved to be a
disastrous failure in action.

266
00:15:22.132 --> 00:15:24.799
(ominous music)

267
00:15:31.710 --> 00:15:33.620
In June, 1941

268
00:15:33.620 --> 00:15:35.760
the time of the German attack,

269
00:15:35.760 --> 00:15:37.400
Army Group North was commanded

270
00:15:37.400 --> 00:15:39.810
by field Marshall Ritter Von Leeb

271
00:15:39.810 --> 00:15:42.690
and was composed of two subsidiary armies.

272
00:15:42.690 --> 00:15:46.710
The 16th army, initially
commanded by field Marshall Busch

273
00:15:46.710 --> 00:15:49.863
and the 18th army commanded
by general Von Kuchler.

274
00:15:51.240 --> 00:15:53.250
For the initial thrust into Russia

275
00:15:53.250 --> 00:15:55.300
under the Barbarossa directive

276
00:15:55.300 --> 00:15:57.250
Army Group North enjoyed the support

277
00:15:57.250 --> 00:15:59.370
of a powerful tank force

278
00:15:59.370 --> 00:16:02.540
designed as Panzer Group
IV under the leadership

279
00:16:02.540 --> 00:16:03.623
of general Hoepner.

280
00:16:04.600 --> 00:16:07.180
For air support Army
Group North could call

281
00:16:07.180 --> 00:16:10.423
upon Luftflotte One,
commanded by general Keller.

282
00:16:11.330 --> 00:16:12.820
The Stukas of Luftflotte One

283
00:16:12.820 --> 00:16:15.090
were to provide the flying artillery

284
00:16:15.090 --> 00:16:17.553
for the lightning attack
of the 22nd of June.

285
00:16:20.680 --> 00:16:23.640
Naval support was available
from the powerful battle group

286
00:16:23.640 --> 00:16:26.720
North under the command of Admiral Carls,

287
00:16:26.720 --> 00:16:28.330
who set about planning the campaign

288
00:16:28.330 --> 00:16:29.763
with his senior commanders.

289
00:16:38.040 --> 00:16:40.350
As commander of Army Group North

290
00:16:40.350 --> 00:16:42.960
Von Leeb had excellent credibility.

291
00:16:42.960 --> 00:16:46.070
He had formerly commanded
the German Army Group center,

292
00:16:46.070 --> 00:16:48.080
which had succeeded
brilliantly in the attack

293
00:16:48.080 --> 00:16:50.580
on France in 1940.

294
00:16:50.580 --> 00:16:53.300
He was extremely well-supported
by some of the most capable

295
00:16:53.300 --> 00:16:55.813
commanders the German
army had in its ranks.

296
00:17:13.480 --> 00:17:15.840
As the German officers could
draw on the experiences

297
00:17:15.840 --> 00:17:19.430
of the war in Poland, France,
Norway, and the Balkans,

298
00:17:19.430 --> 00:17:21.970
the quality of their
commanders was always likely

299
00:17:21.970 --> 00:17:23.920
to be superior to that of the Russians.

300
00:17:30.251 --> 00:17:32.918
(ominous music)

301
00:17:40.240 --> 00:17:42.210
For the great assault on Russia,

302
00:17:42.210 --> 00:17:43.500
Army Group North could count

303
00:17:43.500 --> 00:17:47.510
on over 800,000 men and 800 tanks

304
00:17:47.510 --> 00:17:50.440
organized into three armored divisions,

305
00:17:50.440 --> 00:17:53.300
three motorized infantry divisions,

306
00:17:53.300 --> 00:17:57.721
20 infantry divisions, and
three security divisions.

307
00:17:57.721 --> 00:17:59.447
(Hitler yells)

308
00:17:59.447 --> 00:18:01.200
(soldiers singing)

309
00:18:01.200 --> 00:18:04.090
Army group North was by no
means the armored juggernaut

310
00:18:04.090 --> 00:18:05.980
of popular mythology.

311
00:18:05.980 --> 00:18:08.180
Four-fifths of the soldiers had to walk

312
00:18:08.180 --> 00:18:10.810
into battle like the soldiers of Napoleon

313
00:18:10.810 --> 00:18:12.634
over a century earlier.

314
00:18:12.634 --> 00:18:15.801
(upbeat German music)

315
00:18:20.030 --> 00:18:22.450
In 1941, the mechanized era

316
00:18:22.450 --> 00:18:24.170
was still in its infancy

317
00:18:24.170 --> 00:18:25.210
and Army Group North

318
00:18:25.210 --> 00:18:29.903
needed 200,000 horses to draw
their guns and equipment.

319
00:18:29.903 --> 00:18:32.820
(German war music)

320
00:18:40.030 --> 00:18:43.170
The Army Group could deploy 1200 guns

321
00:18:43.170 --> 00:18:45.150
in terms of tanks and aircraft,

322
00:18:45.150 --> 00:18:50.150
Army Group North could boasts
600 tanks and 430 aircraft.

323
00:18:50.420 --> 00:18:52.970
Most of them superior to the Russian tanks

324
00:18:52.970 --> 00:18:54.953
and all of them in better condition.

325
00:18:57.100 --> 00:18:59.770
Army Group North tends to
be treated in some respects

326
00:18:59.770 --> 00:19:00.990
as the poor relation

327
00:19:00.990 --> 00:19:04.260
compared to Army Group
South and army group Center.

328
00:19:04.260 --> 00:19:06.890
But initially, although
there were fewer formations

329
00:19:06.890 --> 00:19:08.140
of Army Group North,

330
00:19:08.140 --> 00:19:10.380
they actually achieved
their initial objectives

331
00:19:10.380 --> 00:19:12.760
with great skill and speed.

332
00:19:12.760 --> 00:19:15.677
(vehicle explodes)

333
00:19:17.635 --> 00:19:20.385
(engine rumbles)

334
00:19:22.880 --> 00:19:25.213
(gun fires)

335
00:19:28.487 --> 00:19:30.904
(loud blast)

336
00:19:32.380 --> 00:19:35.260
Ribbentrop, Hitler's foreign
minister had successfully

337
00:19:35.260 --> 00:19:36.960
concluded a non-aggression pact

338
00:19:36.960 --> 00:19:39.723
between Germany and Russia in 1940.

339
00:19:40.590 --> 00:19:42.830
Nevertheless, Stalin was wise enough

340
00:19:42.830 --> 00:19:44.690
to remain wary of his sinister

341
00:19:44.690 --> 00:19:46.760
neighbors to the West.

342
00:19:46.760 --> 00:19:49.030
Stalin's overall military strategy

343
00:19:49.030 --> 00:19:52.330
required the expansion of Soviet
territory to create a deep

344
00:19:52.330 --> 00:19:56.200
barrier of Russian held territory
between the Soviet union

345
00:19:56.200 --> 00:19:57.563
and Nazi Germany.

346
00:19:58.420 --> 00:20:00.760
It was this consideration
which had led Stalin

347
00:20:00.760 --> 00:20:03.483
to collaborate with Hitler
in the invasion of Poland.

348
00:20:07.860 --> 00:20:10.330
Ironically, the secret negotiations

349
00:20:10.330 --> 00:20:12.650
instigated by Germany had also

350
00:20:12.650 --> 00:20:16.000
granted Stalin the freehand
in the Baltic and Finland,

351
00:20:16.000 --> 00:20:17.780
which had precipitated the winter war,

352
00:20:17.780 --> 00:20:20.353
which the Fins were now so keen to avenge.

353
00:20:24.750 --> 00:20:27.220
From behind this defensive wall

354
00:20:27.220 --> 00:20:29.390
Stalin planed to allow the Western allies

355
00:20:29.390 --> 00:20:33.220
and Germany to fight a mutually
destructive war in the West,

356
00:20:33.220 --> 00:20:35.870
as they had done for four
years during the great war.

357
00:20:38.184 --> 00:20:42.101
(series of distant explosions)

358
00:21:02.897 --> 00:21:05.564
(ominous music)

359
00:21:14.830 --> 00:21:18.430
The early war Russian fighters
were already obsolete.

360
00:21:18.430 --> 00:21:21.890
Aircraft such as the Polikarpov I153

361
00:21:21.890 --> 00:21:23.850
a lumbering biplane,

362
00:21:23.850 --> 00:21:27.610
and the Polikarpov I16 known
as the ratter were easily

363
00:21:27.610 --> 00:21:30.673
outclassed by the new
generation of German fighters.

364
00:21:34.930 --> 00:21:38.270
These included the German
Messerschmitt 109 fighters,

365
00:21:38.270 --> 00:21:41.270
which were faster and more
maneuverable than anything

366
00:21:41.270 --> 00:21:43.300
the Russians could throw against them.

367
00:21:53.760 --> 00:21:56.093
(loud boom)

368
00:22:00.373 --> 00:22:03.040
(ominous music)

369
00:22:14.230 --> 00:22:19.010
At last, at 04:00 on
the 22nd of June, 1941,

370
00:22:19.010 --> 00:22:22.790
the code word "Dortmund"
crackled down the wires

371
00:22:22.790 --> 00:22:25.600
and the full force of
operation Barbarossa,

372
00:22:25.600 --> 00:22:28.473
Germany's invasion of Soviet
Russia, was unleashed.

373
00:22:30.525 --> 00:22:32.157
(airplane roars)

374
00:22:32.157 --> 00:22:34.907
(loud explosion)

375
00:22:43.270 --> 00:22:45.130
AS they had come to expect

376
00:22:45.130 --> 00:22:46.670
the German army sliced through

377
00:22:46.670 --> 00:22:48.643
the opposition on the way to Leningrad.

378
00:22:49.530 --> 00:22:51.610
Faced by the result of his own failures

379
00:22:51.610 --> 00:22:54.900
in military matters, Stalin panicked.

380
00:22:54.900 --> 00:22:56.630
While his army headquarters desperately

381
00:22:56.630 --> 00:22:58.740
tried to piece together
the most rudimentary

382
00:22:58.740 --> 00:23:00.530
picture of what was happening,

383
00:23:00.530 --> 00:23:03.923
he ordered an immediate counter
offensive on all fronts.

384
00:23:04.780 --> 00:23:06.810
As the first reports of the devastation

385
00:23:06.810 --> 00:23:09.390
he had helped to create filtered through,

386
00:23:09.390 --> 00:23:10.983
he was close to breaking point.

387
00:23:14.467 --> 00:23:17.790
"All that Lennon created,
we have lost forever",

388
00:23:17.790 --> 00:23:22.240
he declared, before retreating
to his dacha not to emerge

389
00:23:22.240 --> 00:23:23.973
until the 3rd of July.

390
00:23:29.180 --> 00:23:32.070
What really stunned the Red
Army commanders was that this

391
00:23:32.070 --> 00:23:35.350
massive German assault had
proceeded long after it had left

392
00:23:35.350 --> 00:23:38.360
its artillery support behind.

393
00:23:38.360 --> 00:23:40.020
The Red Army command had planned

394
00:23:40.020 --> 00:23:44.550
for conventional meeting
engagements and frontline battles.

395
00:23:44.550 --> 00:23:46.810
The perceived wisdom was
that these would develop

396
00:23:46.810 --> 00:23:49.560
over days or even weeks.

397
00:23:49.560 --> 00:23:53.000
Next would come a large
series of complex engagements.

398
00:23:53.000 --> 00:23:55.523
And then the real war would begin.

399
00:23:56.550 --> 00:23:59.920
In reality, using the
new Blitzkrieg tactics,

400
00:23:59.920 --> 00:24:03.080
the German advance was so
swift that within hours of

401
00:24:03.080 --> 00:24:04.750
the launch of Barbarossa

402
00:24:04.750 --> 00:24:07.210
tank columns from Panzer Group IV were

403
00:24:07.210 --> 00:24:11.183
approaching Riga some 50
miles behind the front.

404
00:24:15.540 --> 00:24:18.060
This extended Blitzkrieg technique,

405
00:24:18.060 --> 00:24:21.350
especially the bold use of
armor came as an extraordinary

406
00:24:21.350 --> 00:24:24.070
and disorientating
surprise to the Russians,

407
00:24:24.070 --> 00:24:26.273
even to the senior Soviet commanders.

408
00:24:36.220 --> 00:24:37.740
Within 48 hours,

409
00:24:37.740 --> 00:24:40.150
general staff reports
made it perfectly plain,

410
00:24:40.150 --> 00:24:42.463
that they had lost
control of the situation.

411
00:24:43.440 --> 00:24:45.420
They were in complete chaos,

412
00:24:45.420 --> 00:24:48.140
and many did not know
where their troops were

413
00:24:48.140 --> 00:24:49.333
or what was happening.

414
00:24:52.020 --> 00:24:54.730
They certainly did not have
accurate reports of German

415
00:24:54.730 --> 00:24:58.100
movements, and there was
no real intelligence.

416
00:24:58.100 --> 00:24:59.350
So they were not even sure

417
00:24:59.350 --> 00:25:01.950
where the German thrusts were aimed.

418
00:25:01.950 --> 00:25:04.550
All that they did know
was that in the Northwest,

419
00:25:04.550 --> 00:25:06.680
there was total collapse.

420
00:25:06.680 --> 00:25:10.450
In consequence, Stalin
operated his usual practice.

421
00:25:10.450 --> 00:25:14.120
He had most of the front
commanders arrested and then shot

422
00:25:16.620 --> 00:25:18.350
as a consequence of the confusion

423
00:25:18.350 --> 00:25:20.310
which raged throughout the army,

424
00:25:20.310 --> 00:25:23.400
many of the Red Army
divisions simply broke up

425
00:25:23.400 --> 00:25:24.950
and formed very large pockets

426
00:25:24.950 --> 00:25:26.273
of leaderless troops.

427
00:25:27.280 --> 00:25:28.400
Passing these groups

428
00:25:28.400 --> 00:25:31.880
of disorientated men, Von
Leeb's Army Group North

429
00:25:31.880 --> 00:25:35.520
scythed into the Baltic
States, capturing Riga,

430
00:25:35.520 --> 00:25:37.428
the Latvian capital.

431
00:25:37.428 --> 00:25:40.428
(suspenseful music)

432
00:25:57.553 --> 00:26:00.303
(loud explosion)

433
00:26:02.040 --> 00:26:05.340
The number of prisoners taken
and the war material captured

434
00:26:05.340 --> 00:26:07.730
or destroyed in operation Barbarossa

435
00:26:07.730 --> 00:26:10.830
was assuming astronomical proportions.

436
00:26:10.830 --> 00:26:13.830
It is hardly surprising
that Hitler, his commanders

437
00:26:13.830 --> 00:26:15.290
and the troops themselves

438
00:26:15.290 --> 00:26:16.800
now believed that the Red Army

439
00:26:16.800 --> 00:26:19.150
must be nearing the end of its resources,

440
00:26:19.150 --> 00:26:21.613
both in manpower and in weapons.

441
00:26:22.540 --> 00:26:24.480
Prisoners confess that the German attack

442
00:26:24.480 --> 00:26:26.870
had been completely unexpected.

443
00:26:26.870 --> 00:26:31.053
Moscow, it seemed, was certain
to fall into German hands.

444
00:26:32.100 --> 00:26:34.683
Great optimism prevailed
in Army Group Center.

445
00:26:35.640 --> 00:26:39.110
Hitler had already set up
a special engineer command

446
00:26:39.110 --> 00:26:41.733
whose task was to be the
demolition of the Kremlin.

447
00:26:45.460 --> 00:26:48.090
The propaganda ministry
saw fit to make a bombastic

448
00:26:48.090 --> 00:26:51.580
statement announcing that
the war in the East was won

449
00:26:51.580 --> 00:26:54.355
and the Red Army practically annihilated.

450
00:26:54.355 --> 00:26:58.050
(German leader gives speech)

451
00:26:58.050 --> 00:27:00.510
During the early stages of the campaign,

452
00:27:00.510 --> 00:27:03.130
the Stuka dive bombers of Luftflotte One

453
00:27:03.130 --> 00:27:04.630
played their familiar role

454
00:27:04.630 --> 00:27:07.830
as the German storm broke against Russia.

455
00:27:07.830 --> 00:27:11.360
The initial moves followed the
classic Blitzkrieg pattern,

456
00:27:11.360 --> 00:27:14.770
no declaration of war
and a fast moving assault

457
00:27:14.770 --> 00:27:17.783
designed to disorientate and
confuse the Russian army.

458
00:27:20.350 --> 00:27:22.860
As the forces of Army
Group North drove further

459
00:27:22.860 --> 00:27:24.430
into the Baltic States,

460
00:27:24.430 --> 00:27:27.163
Latvia and Estonia were quickly captured.

461
00:27:34.020 --> 00:27:35.640
These lightning advances were greeted

462
00:27:35.640 --> 00:27:38.620
with joy by the citizens
of cities like Riga,

463
00:27:38.620 --> 00:27:41.743
where the population viewed the
German armies as liberators.

464
00:28:06.400 --> 00:28:08.400
In scenes of unprompted joy,

465
00:28:08.400 --> 00:28:10.990
the German soldiers were
greeted with flowers and kisses

466
00:28:10.990 --> 00:28:12.040
from the local girls.

467
00:28:42.310 --> 00:28:45.070
A great deal of the Naval
effort throughout the campaign

468
00:28:45.070 --> 00:28:47.900
lay in suppressing Soviet Naval activity

469
00:28:47.900 --> 00:28:50.290
by laying thousands of mines,

470
00:28:50.290 --> 00:28:52.010
a task, which continued

471
00:28:52.010 --> 00:28:54.493
even in the face of fierce air resistance.

472
00:29:01.585 --> 00:29:04.570
(rapid gunfire)

473
00:29:04.570 --> 00:29:06.910
These ships of Carl's battle group

474
00:29:06.910 --> 00:29:08.120
continued with the task

475
00:29:08.120 --> 00:29:11.483
of mine laying, despite the
attentions of the red air force.

476
00:29:20.340 --> 00:29:23.290
On land, the presence of
a strong armored force

477
00:29:23.290 --> 00:29:25.348
in the form of Panzer Group IV

478
00:29:25.348 --> 00:29:28.320
gave Army Group North some
much needed tank support

479
00:29:28.320 --> 00:29:30.320
during the headlong advance into Russia.

480
00:29:31.260 --> 00:29:33.720
Nevertheless, the rudimentary road system

481
00:29:33.720 --> 00:29:34.760
of the Baltic States

482
00:29:34.760 --> 00:29:37.683
and Northern Russia played
havoc with the tanks.

483
00:29:38.990 --> 00:29:41.330
Right at the beginning
of the Russian campaign,

484
00:29:41.330 --> 00:29:44.610
the Germans experienced the
problems which dust can cause

485
00:29:44.610 --> 00:29:46.340
in motor vehicles.

486
00:29:46.340 --> 00:29:48.840
Tanks sustained severe
damage from the dust

487
00:29:48.840 --> 00:29:52.310
they stirred up while
crossing vast sandy regions,

488
00:29:52.310 --> 00:29:55.630
many tanks had no dust filters
and on those which were

489
00:29:55.630 --> 00:29:59.520
equipped, the filters soon
became thoroughly clogged.

490
00:29:59.520 --> 00:30:01.990
Quartz dust was sucked into engines,

491
00:30:01.990 --> 00:30:05.200
which became so ground out
that many tanks were rendered

492
00:30:05.200 --> 00:30:08.010
unserviceable, in other tanks,

493
00:30:08.010 --> 00:30:11.570
the abrasive action of dust
reduced engine efficiency

494
00:30:11.570 --> 00:30:13.923
and massively increased fuel consumption.

495
00:30:16.710 --> 00:30:20.120
The sand roads undoubtedly
caused problems.

496
00:30:20.120 --> 00:30:23.260
They greatly slowed tanks or trucks.

497
00:30:23.260 --> 00:30:25.400
They also caused huge dust clouds,

498
00:30:25.400 --> 00:30:27.083
which were raised by convoys.

499
00:30:28.220 --> 00:30:30.940
These dust clouds frequently
provoked air attacks

500
00:30:30.940 --> 00:30:33.393
by the surviving aircraft
of the red air force.

501
00:30:34.300 --> 00:30:36.900
As the red air force
re-gathered its strength,

502
00:30:36.900 --> 00:30:39.890
these attacks resulted
in serious losses of men,

503
00:30:39.890 --> 00:30:41.783
vehicles and horses.

504
00:30:49.350 --> 00:30:52.060
For as long as they were in
support of Army Group North,

505
00:30:52.060 --> 00:30:55.880
the tanks of Panzer Group IV
played an invaluable role,

506
00:30:55.880 --> 00:30:57.470
but even with the Panzers,

507
00:30:57.470 --> 00:31:01.050
the swift advances of June and
July ground to a halt against

508
00:31:01.050 --> 00:31:03.390
the tough defenses of the Stalin line,

509
00:31:03.390 --> 00:31:06.203
which were encountered in
August and early September.

510
00:31:07.800 --> 00:31:10.720
While the fortifications of the
frontier districts left much

511
00:31:10.720 --> 00:31:12.030
to be desired,

512
00:31:12.030 --> 00:31:15.130
there were still extensive
fortifications to be overcome

513
00:31:15.130 --> 00:31:16.673
deep within mother Russia.

514
00:31:17.700 --> 00:31:20.260
Although they did not
form a solid unbroken line

515
00:31:20.260 --> 00:31:23.410
of fortifications, like
the French Maggiano line,

516
00:31:23.410 --> 00:31:26.900
the heavily defended Stalin
line or the Leningrad line

517
00:31:26.900 --> 00:31:29.270
as the German forces in the North knew it,

518
00:31:29.270 --> 00:31:32.073
was a formidable series
of prepared defenses.

519
00:31:33.400 --> 00:31:35.350
Areas of great importance were

520
00:31:35.350 --> 00:31:38.810
surrounded with heavy fortifications
and the German armored

521
00:31:38.810 --> 00:31:42.030
units driving for Leningrad
encountered fortification

522
00:31:42.030 --> 00:31:44.780
systems up to six miles in depth,

523
00:31:44.780 --> 00:31:48.060
including well-positioned
earth and concrete bunkers

524
00:31:48.060 --> 00:31:50.493
with built-in guns and
other heavy weapons.

525
00:31:51.410 --> 00:31:54.710
There were also concrete
pillboxes with disappearing

526
00:31:54.710 --> 00:31:57.693
armored cupolas for
artillery and machine guns.

527
00:31:58.940 --> 00:32:02.200
A speedy elimination of these
strong defenses with the means

528
00:32:02.200 --> 00:32:05.300
available to a force
designed for mobile warfare

529
00:32:05.300 --> 00:32:06.853
was extremely difficult.

530
00:32:07.774 --> 00:32:10.774
(suspenseful music)

531
00:32:20.400 --> 00:32:22.390
The area of Krasnogvardeysk,

532
00:32:22.390 --> 00:32:24.950
South of Leningrad, had been developed

533
00:32:24.950 --> 00:32:27.970
according to sound soviet
defensive principles,

534
00:32:27.970 --> 00:32:30.580
and was effectively turned
into an outlying fortress

535
00:32:30.580 --> 00:32:32.153
for the defensive Leningrad.

536
00:32:33.030 --> 00:32:35.670
During early September, 1941

537
00:32:35.670 --> 00:32:37.220
it presented great difficulties

538
00:32:37.220 --> 00:32:39.263
to the advance of the German forces.

539
00:32:42.610 --> 00:32:46.150
Krasnogvardeysk blocked all
highways and railroads leading

540
00:32:46.150 --> 00:32:48.300
to Leningrad from the South

541
00:32:48.300 --> 00:32:51.940
and constituted the main
bulwark of Russian resistance.

542
00:32:51.940 --> 00:32:54.800
The Russians defended it persistently.

543
00:32:54.800 --> 00:32:56.430
Repeated attacks by several

544
00:32:56.430 --> 00:32:58.980
infantry divisions were repulsed.

545
00:32:58.980 --> 00:33:01.330
It was only taken in the
course of a general attack

546
00:33:01.330 --> 00:33:02.920
on the Leningrad line

547
00:33:02.920 --> 00:33:05.380
and after bitter pillbox
fighting in the area

548
00:33:05.380 --> 00:33:08.157
immediately surrounding Krasnogvardeysk.

549
00:33:09.013 --> 00:33:12.013
(suspenseful music)

550
00:33:26.950 --> 00:33:30.580
Only the flexible leadership
of battle-tested armored forces

551
00:33:30.580 --> 00:33:32.280
attacking with great vigor

552
00:33:32.280 --> 00:33:34.960
made it possible to
overcome the defense zones

553
00:33:34.960 --> 00:33:36.910
which had been set up
with a sound knowledge

554
00:33:36.910 --> 00:33:38.783
of the latest defense techniques.

555
00:33:39.830 --> 00:33:42.980
Within a week, the German
sixth Panzer division

556
00:33:42.980 --> 00:33:44.130
had been forced to break

557
00:33:44.130 --> 00:33:48.060
through and roll up 12
positions, repel several

558
00:33:48.060 --> 00:33:49.790
counter attacks and take

559
00:33:49.790 --> 00:33:52.733
more than 300 heavily fortified bunkers.

560
00:33:53.820 --> 00:33:56.460
Like all German operations in Russia

561
00:33:56.460 --> 00:33:59.480
from an early stage, it became
apparent to the commanders,

562
00:33:59.480 --> 00:34:00.510
to the troops,

563
00:34:00.510 --> 00:34:04.570
to the high command that the
task they had taken on and the

564
00:34:04.570 --> 00:34:07.800
tasks they may have to take
on were beginning to exceed

565
00:34:07.800 --> 00:34:10.303
by far, the resources to hand.

566
00:34:11.680 --> 00:34:12.760
In general terms,

567
00:34:12.760 --> 00:34:15.350
the forces were adequate
for the immediate tasks

568
00:34:15.350 --> 00:34:18.060
which Army Group North had to fulfill.

569
00:34:18.060 --> 00:34:20.370
It was a very accomplished command

570
00:34:20.370 --> 00:34:23.650
and it did manage to achieve
what Hitler ordered to be done,

571
00:34:23.650 --> 00:34:25.910
which was to seize the Baltic States,

572
00:34:25.910 --> 00:34:29.570
establishing them as a base for
further operations in Russia

573
00:34:29.570 --> 00:34:31.343
and move right up to Leningrad.

574
00:34:37.000 --> 00:34:39.630
From October, 1941 onwards,

575
00:34:39.630 --> 00:34:42.010
Hitler tended to
vacillate between striking

576
00:34:42.010 --> 00:34:45.490
into the Ukraine as the
main strategic objective

577
00:34:45.490 --> 00:34:46.840
and attacking Moscow,

578
00:34:46.840 --> 00:34:49.040
which was the nerve
center of Soviet Russia.

579
00:34:52.870 --> 00:34:54.140
Army Group North therefore

580
00:34:54.140 --> 00:34:57.483
came a poor third in terms
of allocation of resources.

581
00:34:58.330 --> 00:35:00.730
It is fair to suggest
that Hitler's high command

582
00:35:00.730 --> 00:35:04.150
failed to provide Von Leeb
with enough resources,

583
00:35:04.150 --> 00:35:07.180
which in turn prevented Army
Group North from achieving

584
00:35:07.180 --> 00:35:09.280
its objective of the capture of Leningrad.

585
00:35:16.506 --> 00:35:20.173
(series of loud explosions)

586
00:35:32.930 --> 00:35:33.880
In the North,

587
00:35:33.880 --> 00:35:35.610
the fighting for the Stalin line

588
00:35:35.610 --> 00:35:37.810
proved to be an attritional nightmare

589
00:35:37.810 --> 00:35:40.000
with German casualties soon mounting

590
00:35:40.000 --> 00:35:41.773
to first world war levels.

591
00:35:43.310 --> 00:35:45.490
The Russians were very adept at preparing

592
00:35:45.490 --> 00:35:48.230
inhabited places for defense.

593
00:35:48.230 --> 00:35:49.500
In a short time,

594
00:35:49.500 --> 00:35:52.163
a village would be converted
into a little fortress.

595
00:35:53.060 --> 00:35:55.670
Wooden houses had well
camouflaged gun ports

596
00:35:55.670 --> 00:35:57.880
almost flush with the floor.

597
00:35:57.880 --> 00:36:01.650
Their interiors were reinforced
with sandbags or earth.

598
00:36:01.650 --> 00:36:05.220
Observation slots were cut into
roofs and bunkers built into

599
00:36:05.220 --> 00:36:08.380
floors and connected with
adjacent houses or outside

600
00:36:08.380 --> 00:36:10.968
defenses by narrow trenches.

601
00:36:10.968 --> 00:36:13.968
(suspenseful music)

602
00:36:18.290 --> 00:36:20.330
Although almost all inhabited places

603
00:36:20.330 --> 00:36:22.170
were crammed with troops,

604
00:36:22.170 --> 00:36:25.650
they seem deserted to German
reconnaissance since even water

605
00:36:25.650 --> 00:36:27.470
and food details were allowed to leave

606
00:36:27.470 --> 00:36:29.573
their shelters only after dark.

607
00:36:44.935 --> 00:36:47.768
(large explosion)

608
00:36:48.700 --> 00:36:51.330
The Russians blocked approach
routes with well camouflaged

609
00:36:51.330 --> 00:36:54.560
anti-tank guns or dug-in tanks.

610
00:36:54.560 --> 00:36:57.230
Wrecks of knocked out tanks
were specially favored

611
00:36:57.230 --> 00:36:59.170
for use as observation posts.

612
00:36:59.170 --> 00:37:01.880
And as in placements for
heavy infantry weapons

613
00:37:01.880 --> 00:37:04.923
and bunkers for living
quarters were dug under them.

614
00:37:07.270 --> 00:37:09.990
Permanent structures
destroyed by artillery fire,

615
00:37:09.990 --> 00:37:14.060
or aerial bombs were
utilized as defense points,

616
00:37:14.060 --> 00:37:16.560
the ruins hid weapons
and served to strengthen

617
00:37:16.560 --> 00:37:18.750
the underlying bunkers.

618
00:37:18.750 --> 00:37:21.310
Even the heaviest shelling
would not drive the Russians

619
00:37:21.310 --> 00:37:23.200
from these positions.

620
00:37:23.200 --> 00:37:26.230
They could only be
dislodged with hand grenades

621
00:37:26.230 --> 00:37:29.743
or flame throwers in costly
hand-to-hand fighting.

622
00:37:30.830 --> 00:37:33.110
The Russians when they did retreat

623
00:37:33.110 --> 00:37:36.480
frequently burned or blasted
building suitable for housing

624
00:37:36.480 --> 00:37:39.853
command posts or other important
military installations.

625
00:37:40.750 --> 00:37:43.570
Quite often, however, they left castles,

626
00:37:43.570 --> 00:37:47.850
former country seats and other
spacious dwellings intact,

627
00:37:47.850 --> 00:37:51.060
but only after they had mined
the walls in a completely

628
00:37:51.060 --> 00:37:54.010
inconspicuous manner with
delayed action bombs,

629
00:37:54.010 --> 00:37:56.853
which were often set to
explode several weeks later.

630
00:37:58.050 --> 00:38:00.630
These were meant to blow up
entire German headquarters

631
00:38:00.630 --> 00:38:01.633
at one time.

632
00:38:02.750 --> 00:38:05.800
The possible presence
of time bombs in cities,

633
00:38:05.800 --> 00:38:07.828
railroad stations, bridges,

634
00:38:07.828 --> 00:38:11.270
and other important structures
always had to be taken into

635
00:38:11.270 --> 00:38:13.170
account in German thinking,

636
00:38:13.170 --> 00:38:15.593
exacting a great psychological toll.

637
00:38:19.957 --> 00:38:23.040
(distant explosions)

638
00:38:24.120 --> 00:38:27.590
Entirely new to the Germans
was the Russian use of forest

639
00:38:27.590 --> 00:38:30.160
fires as a hot weather weapon.

640
00:38:30.160 --> 00:38:31.930
In mid-summer when the trees

641
00:38:31.930 --> 00:38:33.320
were tinder dry,

642
00:38:33.320 --> 00:38:36.230
the Russians attempted to
delay German forces advancing

643
00:38:36.230 --> 00:38:39.453
on Leningrad by putting
forests to the torch.

644
00:38:40.400 --> 00:38:41.640
Not only the physical,

645
00:38:41.640 --> 00:38:45.480
but the psychological impact
of such fires was severe.

646
00:38:45.480 --> 00:38:47.600
The crackling of the burning trees,

647
00:38:47.600 --> 00:38:49.950
the acrid gray black smoke,

648
00:38:49.950 --> 00:38:52.870
the increasingly unbearable
heat and the feeling

649
00:38:52.870 --> 00:38:56.573
of uncertainty put troops
under a severe strain.

650
00:39:04.620 --> 00:39:07.540
Despite the tenacity of a
hard fought series of grueling

651
00:39:07.540 --> 00:39:10.530
battles in which the SS
police division particularly

652
00:39:10.530 --> 00:39:13.230
distinguished itself, the Stalin line

653
00:39:13.230 --> 00:39:16.160
was finally broken in late August

654
00:39:16.160 --> 00:39:19.103
and Army Group North surged onwards.

655
00:39:22.926 --> 00:39:25.593
(ominous music)

656
00:39:33.680 --> 00:39:36.580
On the Baltic front, Von
Leeb's Army Group North

657
00:39:36.580 --> 00:39:38.950
had captured the city of Novgorod,

658
00:39:38.950 --> 00:39:41.413
a vital target in the
approach to Leningrad.

659
00:39:42.600 --> 00:39:44.970
The beleaguered defenders of Novgorod

660
00:39:44.970 --> 00:39:46.650
had fought to the death.

661
00:39:46.650 --> 00:39:48.933
But this resistance too had been in vain.

662
00:39:50.320 --> 00:39:53.070
The Germans had discovered
the city's defensive plans

663
00:39:53.070 --> 00:39:54.963
on the corpse of a Soviet officer.

664
00:40:00.770 --> 00:40:02.880
With the Stalin line broken

665
00:40:02.880 --> 00:40:06.210
general Hoepner's fourth
Panzer group resumed its drive

666
00:40:06.210 --> 00:40:09.560
toward Leningrad, but
without supporting infantry

667
00:40:09.560 --> 00:40:10.953
its progress was limited.

668
00:40:12.902 --> 00:40:14.310
(ominous music)

669
00:40:14.310 --> 00:40:17.250
Leningrad was a vital center
of the wartime production

670
00:40:17.250 --> 00:40:20.060
industry and reserves
and equipment were poured

671
00:40:20.060 --> 00:40:21.593
into the defense of the city.

672
00:40:22.430 --> 00:40:23.869
As the Germans approached,

673
00:40:23.869 --> 00:40:27.800
the citizens now formed into
militia divisions of which

674
00:40:27.800 --> 00:40:31.163
were flung against the Germans
more in despair than hope.

675
00:40:32.270 --> 00:40:36.170
Following a basic training
period, averaging 16 hours,

676
00:40:36.170 --> 00:40:39.160
the first militia divisions
were sent to the front only six

677
00:40:39.160 --> 00:40:41.660
days after being formed.

678
00:40:41.660 --> 00:40:44.850
The second division marched to
the front only two days after

679
00:40:44.850 --> 00:40:47.260
its establishment and the third,

680
00:40:47.260 --> 00:40:50.128
the same day it was established.

681
00:40:50.128 --> 00:40:53.378
(series of explosions)

682
00:41:01.117 --> 00:41:03.950
(large explosion)

683
00:41:27.860 --> 00:41:30.550
Nonetheless, some Russian civilians

684
00:41:30.550 --> 00:41:33.670
obviously felt caught between two fires,

685
00:41:33.670 --> 00:41:35.620
one senior Soviet officer

686
00:41:35.620 --> 00:41:38.020
later summed up the choices available.

687
00:41:38.020 --> 00:41:40.230
He declared, "We were faced with a choice

688
00:41:40.230 --> 00:41:43.830
between two dictators
Hitler on the one hand

689
00:41:43.830 --> 00:41:46.000
and Stalin on the other.

690
00:41:46.000 --> 00:41:48.667
But we prefer to pick the
one who spoke Russian."

691
00:41:51.139 --> 00:41:53.806
(ominous music)

692
00:42:01.460 --> 00:42:04.370
An ominous development for
the Germans at this point

693
00:42:04.370 --> 00:42:06.020
was the appearance on the battlefield

694
00:42:06.020 --> 00:42:11.020
of the Russian medium T34
tank and the heavy KV 1.

695
00:42:11.570 --> 00:42:14.380
Both of these machines were
clearly superior to the German

696
00:42:14.380 --> 00:42:16.610
tanks and were all but impervious

697
00:42:16.610 --> 00:42:19.090
to most German anti-tank weapons,

698
00:42:19.090 --> 00:42:22.970
especially the puny 37
millimeter anti-tank gun,

699
00:42:22.970 --> 00:42:26.270
which was then the main
German anti-tank weapon.

700
00:42:26.270 --> 00:42:30.240
The 37 millimeter was so
ineffective against Soviet armor

701
00:42:30.240 --> 00:42:33.410
that it was nicknamed "the door
knocker" by the disgruntled

702
00:42:33.410 --> 00:42:34.963
German anti-tank gunners.

703
00:42:36.070 --> 00:42:39.470
These puny 37 millimeter
guns were intended to deal

704
00:42:39.470 --> 00:42:42.400
with some of the best armor in the world.

705
00:42:42.400 --> 00:42:46.030
General Erhard Raus who
fought with Army Group North

706
00:42:46.030 --> 00:42:48.170
left a clear account
of the first encounter

707
00:42:48.170 --> 00:42:49.610
with the new Russian armor

708
00:42:49.610 --> 00:42:51.690
in the shape of the trusty KV1 tanks,

709
00:42:51.690 --> 00:42:53.740
which attacked the third Panzer division.

710
00:42:55.197 --> 00:42:59.040
"Then there suddenly appeared
for the first time a battalion

711
00:42:59.040 --> 00:43:02.523
of heavy enemy tanks of
previously unknown type.

712
00:43:03.460 --> 00:43:06.700
The tanks overran the armored
infantry regiment and broke

713
00:43:06.700 --> 00:43:08.500
through into the artillery position.

714
00:43:15.430 --> 00:43:19.400
The projectiles of all defense
weapons bounced off the thick

715
00:43:19.400 --> 00:43:24.400
enemy armor, 100 German tanks
were unable to check the 20

716
00:43:24.460 --> 00:43:27.063
Russian dreadnoughts and suffered losses.

717
00:43:28.060 --> 00:43:29.860
Several Czech built tanks,

718
00:43:29.860 --> 00:43:32.120
which are bogged down in
the grain fields because of

719
00:43:32.120 --> 00:43:36.250
mechanical trouble were
flattened by the enemy monsters.

720
00:43:36.250 --> 00:43:39.080
The same fate befell a 150 millimeter

721
00:43:39.080 --> 00:43:40.940
medium Howitzer battery,

722
00:43:40.940 --> 00:43:43.313
which kept on firing
until the last minute.

723
00:43:44.200 --> 00:43:47.650
Despite the fact that it scored
numerous direct hits from as

724
00:43:47.650 --> 00:43:51.270
close a range as 200
yards, it's heavy shells

725
00:43:51.270 --> 00:43:54.413
were unable to put even a
single rank out of action.

726
00:43:55.360 --> 00:43:57.840
The situation became critical.

727
00:43:57.840 --> 00:44:01.440
Only the 88 millimeter flak
finally knocked out a few

728
00:44:01.440 --> 00:44:02.450
of the Russian KV1s

729
00:44:03.360 --> 00:44:06.317
and forced the others to
withdraw into the woods."

730
00:44:07.725 --> 00:44:10.725
(suspenseful music)

731
00:44:15.000 --> 00:44:17.940
The only bright sign for the
Wehrmacht was that the new

732
00:44:17.940 --> 00:44:21.180
Russian tanks were still
in relatively short supply

733
00:44:21.180 --> 00:44:22.873
and their battle drill was poor.

734
00:44:24.200 --> 00:44:27.090
Once the scattered formations
have been dealt with the road

735
00:44:27.090 --> 00:44:29.313
to Leningrad lay open again.

736
00:44:39.478 --> 00:44:41.895
(gun blasts)

737
00:45:03.050 --> 00:45:05.960
Despite the limitations
of some of its weaponry,

738
00:45:05.960 --> 00:45:08.160
by September, Army Group North

739
00:45:08.160 --> 00:45:10.930
had destroyed for all practical purposes,

740
00:45:10.930 --> 00:45:12.623
the Soviet Northwest front,

741
00:45:13.555 --> 00:45:16.290
it had virtually eliminated
two Russian armies

742
00:45:16.290 --> 00:45:18.363
driven to the outskirts of Leningrad.

743
00:45:19.340 --> 00:45:21.890
The collapse of the
Northwestern front was a real

744
00:45:21.890 --> 00:45:25.170
catastrophe for the Red
Army and brought Stalin

745
00:45:25.170 --> 00:45:26.743
to the brink of despair.

746
00:45:28.139 --> 00:45:30.150
Leningrad's fate hung by a thread

747
00:45:30.150 --> 00:45:32.180
at the beginning of September,

748
00:45:32.180 --> 00:45:35.780
but Stalin was to make one inspired move.

749
00:45:35.780 --> 00:45:39.170
He appointed Marshal Zhukov
to the command of Leningrad.

750
00:45:39.170 --> 00:45:40.870
And this remarkable soldier

751
00:45:40.870 --> 00:45:43.635
was to prove himself equal to the task.

752
00:45:43.635 --> 00:45:46.635
(suspenseful music)

753
00:45:48.970 --> 00:45:52.500
As Army Group North drove
headlong towards Leningrad,

754
00:45:52.500 --> 00:45:56.110
a further huge haul of confused
Russian prisoners was taken

755
00:45:56.110 --> 00:45:59.800
in the Baltic States and a
large body of Russian troops was

756
00:45:59.800 --> 00:46:03.570
isolated in what became known
as the Oranienbaum pocket

757
00:46:03.570 --> 00:46:06.263
on the Baltic coast to
the West of Leningrad.

758
00:46:11.700 --> 00:46:14.610
The Oranienbaum pocket
was a small semicircle

759
00:46:14.610 --> 00:46:16.740
of Russian held territory,

760
00:46:16.740 --> 00:46:19.350
an area of ground that
was never to be taken

761
00:46:19.350 --> 00:46:20.800
by army group North,

762
00:46:20.800 --> 00:46:24.150
despite all attempts over
the next three years.

763
00:46:24.150 --> 00:46:26.000
And it was to prove a tactical thorn

764
00:46:26.000 --> 00:46:27.733
in the side of the 18th army.

765
00:46:29.820 --> 00:46:32.010
When the 18th army in Panzer Group IV

766
00:46:32.010 --> 00:46:35.840
burst into the Leningrad
area in September, 1941,

767
00:46:35.840 --> 00:46:38.430
they swept forward at high speed

768
00:46:38.430 --> 00:46:40.290
and as they moved swiftly North,

769
00:46:40.290 --> 00:46:43.853
they either destroyed or
brushed aside the Soviet armies.

770
00:46:49.090 --> 00:46:51.840
One tiny element of
the Soviet eighth army,

771
00:46:51.840 --> 00:46:54.480
which had suffered
catastrophically from the attack

772
00:46:54.480 --> 00:46:57.110
was pushed right up to the coast.

773
00:46:57.110 --> 00:47:00.080
There, around the town of Oranienbaum,

774
00:47:00.080 --> 00:47:02.940
three elements of the eighth
army kept up resistance

775
00:47:02.940 --> 00:47:05.400
for virtually three years.

776
00:47:05.400 --> 00:47:08.573
The bridge had acquired
enormous strategic significance.

777
00:47:09.924 --> 00:47:12.924
(suspenseful music)

778
00:47:28.350 --> 00:47:30.590
The Oranienbaum area enabled the Russians

779
00:47:30.590 --> 00:47:33.300
to protect the Island of Kronstadt.

780
00:47:33.300 --> 00:47:36.150
This Island was vital to
the Naval base directly

781
00:47:36.150 --> 00:47:37.543
to the West of Leningrad.

782
00:47:38.660 --> 00:47:40.900
It enabled the Soviet
forces in the region,

783
00:47:40.900 --> 00:47:44.230
both Naval and military, to
prevent the German forces

784
00:47:44.230 --> 00:47:46.890
of army group North completely denying

785
00:47:46.890 --> 00:47:49.640
Leningrad the resources
which enabled it to survive

786
00:47:49.640 --> 00:47:51.643
the subsequent siege of Leningrad.

787
00:47:52.577 --> 00:47:56.400
(suspenseful music)

788
00:47:56.400 --> 00:47:58.850
On September the fourth, 1941

789
00:47:58.850 --> 00:48:02.060
senior lieutenant Dariusz
of the first Panzer regiment

790
00:48:02.060 --> 00:48:04.010
radioed back to headquarters

791
00:48:04.010 --> 00:48:06.313
that his unit had reached Leningrad.

792
00:48:09.670 --> 00:48:12.720
Other units from the 18th
army pressed on to capture

793
00:48:12.720 --> 00:48:15.043
Shlisselburg to the East of Leningrad.

794
00:48:16.490 --> 00:48:19.210
With the arrival of the
rest of the 18th army

795
00:48:19.210 --> 00:48:22.500
to reinforce the Panzers,
on the 8th of September,

796
00:48:22.500 --> 00:48:23.860
the German stranglehold

797
00:48:23.860 --> 00:48:26.353
on the city of Leningrad
tightened further.

798
00:48:27.220 --> 00:48:29.680
The capture of Shlisselburg to the East

799
00:48:29.680 --> 00:48:31.953
signaled the end of rail transport.

800
00:48:32.880 --> 00:48:36.020
The German invaders
surged on as far as Tikvin

801
00:48:36.020 --> 00:48:37.963
deep inside the Russian hinterland.

802
00:48:39.040 --> 00:48:41.730
Despite the best efforts
of the population,

803
00:48:41.730 --> 00:48:43.940
the first shells began to rain down

804
00:48:43.940 --> 00:48:47.060
on Leningrad early in September.

805
00:48:47.060 --> 00:48:50.880
It marked the beginning of a
crucial episode in the war.

806
00:48:50.880 --> 00:48:55.880
The Epic siege of the city,
which would last for 900 days.

807
00:48:56.044 --> 00:48:59.044
(suspenseful music)

808
00:49:05.055 --> 00:49:07.805
(loud explosion)

809
00:49:25.127 --> 00:49:27.794
(ominous music)

810
00:49:40.740 --> 00:49:43.950
As the German advance into
Northern Russia continued

811
00:49:43.950 --> 00:49:46.143
the rail link to Leningrad was cut.

812
00:49:47.180 --> 00:49:49.080
The fate of Leningrad and with it,

813
00:49:49.080 --> 00:49:51.953
30 Russian divisions
appeared to be sealed.

814
00:49:52.840 --> 00:49:55.910
The next stage of the battle
was expected to be an attack

815
00:49:55.910 --> 00:49:57.173
on the beleaguered city.

816
00:49:58.695 --> 00:50:01.641
(weapon blasts)

817
00:50:01.641 --> 00:50:04.354
(weapon blasts)

818
00:50:04.354 --> 00:50:07.187
(distant gunfire)

819
00:50:14.000 --> 00:50:16.320
Contrary to their own expectations

820
00:50:16.320 --> 00:50:19.310
the men of the German 18th
army were not to be asked

821
00:50:19.310 --> 00:50:21.880
to mount a full-scale attack on the city.

822
00:50:21.880 --> 00:50:24.270
And after a series of
hotly contested battles

823
00:50:24.270 --> 00:50:25.650
for the outskirts,

824
00:50:25.650 --> 00:50:29.090
Hitler uncharacteristically
ordered his troops to take

825
00:50:29.090 --> 00:50:32.183
Leningrad by means of
a long drawn out siege.

826
00:50:33.240 --> 00:50:35.360
It has been suggested that he was unnerved

827
00:50:35.360 --> 00:50:37.440
by the remote controlled explosions,

828
00:50:37.440 --> 00:50:41.000
which the Russians had used
so effectively in Kiev.

829
00:50:41.000 --> 00:50:44.503
It is a decision which
still provokes debate today.

830
00:50:48.870 --> 00:50:51.910
There are really two possible
explanations for the failure

831
00:50:51.910 --> 00:50:54.980
of Army Group North to take Leningrad.

832
00:50:54.980 --> 00:50:57.280
One was the conflicting
priorities in the mind

833
00:50:57.280 --> 00:51:00.063
of Adolf Hitler and the army high command.

834
00:51:01.270 --> 00:51:02.940
Hitler vacillated between

835
00:51:02.940 --> 00:51:05.323
prioritizing a number of objectives.

836
00:51:06.410 --> 00:51:07.740
There is also a school of thought

837
00:51:07.740 --> 00:51:10.830
which favors Hitler's adverse
reaction to the huge losses

838
00:51:10.830 --> 00:51:14.333
of the German sixth army in
Kiev in August and September.

839
00:51:15.390 --> 00:51:17.900
In Kiev, thousands of German troops

840
00:51:17.900 --> 00:51:20.710
were lost to remote controlled explosions

841
00:51:20.710 --> 00:51:23.663
and thousands of others to
desperate street fighting.

842
00:51:25.330 --> 00:51:26.800
This, it is thought,

843
00:51:26.800 --> 00:51:29.620
persuaded Hitler that
no German troops should

844
00:51:29.620 --> 00:51:32.150
be made vulnerable by committing
them to the inner city

845
00:51:32.150 --> 00:51:35.000
streets of Moscow and Leningrad.

846
00:51:35.000 --> 00:51:36.150
In any event,

847
00:51:36.150 --> 00:51:39.670
the 18th army lacked the really
heavy artillery necessary

848
00:51:39.670 --> 00:51:41.883
to reduce the defenses of Leningrad.

849
00:51:42.790 --> 00:51:46.060
The massive guns of the German
siege train had already been

850
00:51:46.060 --> 00:51:48.930
allocated to the sector
of Army Group South,

851
00:51:48.930 --> 00:51:50.930
where they were earmarked
for the coming battles

852
00:51:50.930 --> 00:51:51.913
in the Crimea.

853
00:51:52.920 --> 00:51:55.630
To move them all the way across Russia

854
00:51:55.630 --> 00:51:57.953
would have delayed the
operation into winter.

855
00:52:14.090 --> 00:52:15.880
To compound the problems of the battles

856
00:52:15.880 --> 00:52:18.270
for the attackers, Panzer group four

857
00:52:18.270 --> 00:52:22.600
was withdrawn from Army Group
North in late September, 1941

858
00:52:22.600 --> 00:52:26.610
in order to support Army Group
Center in operation Typhoon,

859
00:52:26.610 --> 00:52:28.293
the final drive on Moscow.

860
00:52:30.930 --> 00:52:34.250
No German Army Group could
afford to lose its tanks,

861
00:52:34.250 --> 00:52:37.623
but Army Group North lost
virtually all of its armor.

862
00:52:38.890 --> 00:52:41.280
The withdrawal of the
tanks from Army Group North

863
00:52:41.280 --> 00:52:43.910
meant that the army
was virtually immobile.

864
00:52:43.910 --> 00:52:47.253
It was to remain so
for almost three years.

865
00:52:53.423 --> 00:52:56.090
(rapid gunfire)

866
00:53:05.201 --> 00:53:07.534
(loud boom)

867
00:53:10.217 --> 00:53:12.884
(weapon blasts)

868
00:53:14.660 --> 00:53:17.360
It is easy to suggest that
the loss of Panzer Group four

869
00:53:17.360 --> 00:53:19.460
in September, 1941

870
00:53:19.460 --> 00:53:21.570
was directly responsible for the failure

871
00:53:21.570 --> 00:53:23.820
of Army Group North to take its strategic

872
00:53:23.820 --> 00:53:25.770
objective of Leningrad.

873
00:53:25.770 --> 00:53:29.220
However, this is by no means certain.

874
00:53:29.220 --> 00:53:30.890
The capture of a city as large

875
00:53:30.890 --> 00:53:34.790
and well defended as Leningrad
was by no means certain,

876
00:53:34.790 --> 00:53:36.973
even with a strong armored force.

877
00:53:38.030 --> 00:53:41.170
Nevertheless, the removal
of Panzer Group four

878
00:53:41.170 --> 00:53:44.690
clearly did not help the
cause of Army Group North.

879
00:53:44.690 --> 00:53:47.380
It meant that Army Group
North would be denied this one

880
00:53:47.380 --> 00:53:51.210
formation and the size, speed
and fighting power to advance

881
00:53:51.210 --> 00:53:54.960
quickly into the regions
beyond the city of Leningrad,

882
00:53:54.960 --> 00:53:57.760
link up with the Fins
and effectively cut off

883
00:53:57.760 --> 00:53:59.423
the city from its supplies.

884
00:54:01.490 --> 00:54:04.210
The disappearance of Panzer
Group four proved to be

885
00:54:04.210 --> 00:54:07.070
a forerunner of things to come.

886
00:54:07.070 --> 00:54:08.500
From that point onwards,

887
00:54:08.500 --> 00:54:12.450
the evidence was clear that of
the three German army groups

888
00:54:12.450 --> 00:54:16.013
Army Group North was considered
to be the poor relation.

889
00:54:18.430 --> 00:54:21.440
It soon became obvious that
they could expect to receive no

890
00:54:21.440 --> 00:54:24.490
substantial additional
support of any kind.

891
00:54:24.490 --> 00:54:26.420
And the artillery siege train

892
00:54:26.420 --> 00:54:28.233
would never be sent to Leningrad.

893
00:54:29.220 --> 00:54:31.690
The 18th army, therefore,
had no alternative,

894
00:54:31.690 --> 00:54:34.800
but to take Leningrad by siege.

895
00:54:34.800 --> 00:54:38.090
It seemed that the decisive
battles on the Eastern front

896
00:54:38.090 --> 00:54:40.038
would be fought elsewhere.

897
00:54:40.038 --> 00:54:43.038
(suspenseful music)

898
00:54:44.092 --> 00:54:46.985
(loud blast)

899
00:54:46.985 --> 00:54:49.568
(weapon blast)

900
00:55:04.200 --> 00:55:06.690
With the commencement of
the siege of Leningrad,

901
00:55:06.690 --> 00:55:08.610
a relatively stable frontline

902
00:55:08.610 --> 00:55:11.190
appeared in the Northern sector.

903
00:55:11.190 --> 00:55:13.480
The 16th army fought on the right flank

904
00:55:13.480 --> 00:55:14.790
of the Northern sector,

905
00:55:14.790 --> 00:55:18.173
where it was adjacent to the
left wing of Army Group Center.

906
00:55:19.250 --> 00:55:21.680
The 18th Army fought on the left flank

907
00:55:21.680 --> 00:55:24.080
of the 16th army and as such

908
00:55:24.080 --> 00:55:26.963
formed the extreme Northern
end of the front line.

909
00:55:31.260 --> 00:55:34.440
Army Group North was to
remain doggedly committed

910
00:55:34.440 --> 00:55:35.510
to the Northern flank

911
00:55:35.510 --> 00:55:38.210
of the German armies
fighting on the Eastern front

912
00:55:38.210 --> 00:55:40.253
for the entire duration of the war.

913
00:55:41.743 --> 00:55:44.826
(distant explosions)

914
00:56:03.254 --> 00:56:06.309
(weapon blasts)

915
00:56:06.309 --> 00:56:08.976
(weapon blasts)

916
00:56:13.539 --> 00:56:16.206
(rapid gunfire)

917
00:56:18.010 --> 00:56:21.930
The siege of Leningrad was the
stage for an intense struggle

918
00:56:21.930 --> 00:56:25.220
that would in later years
be recognized as a key event

919
00:56:25.220 --> 00:56:27.773
in that conflict of inhuman savagery.

920
00:56:30.800 --> 00:56:33.280
The opening stages were bitterly fought

921
00:56:33.280 --> 00:56:34.850
in the suburbs of the city.

922
00:56:49.100 --> 00:56:51.767
(weapon blasts)

923
00:56:54.742 --> 00:56:57.409
(weapon blasts)

924
00:57:02.188 --> 00:57:04.855
(weapon blasts)

925
00:57:06.158 --> 00:57:09.630
(weapon blasts)

926
00:57:09.630 --> 00:57:12.297
(ominous music)

927
00:57:20.241 --> 00:57:22.470
(people chattering)

928
00:57:22.470 --> 00:57:24.930
When general Zhukov arrived
to take over the defense

929
00:57:24.930 --> 00:57:28.180
of the city on the 10th
of September, 1941,

930
00:57:28.180 --> 00:57:30.420
he found the defenders
in an advanced state

931
00:57:30.420 --> 00:57:34.163
of disorganization and the
inhabitants close to panic.

932
00:57:38.180 --> 00:57:41.863
Undaunted, he briskly set
about bolstering its defenses.

933
00:57:42.930 --> 00:57:46.020
A shortage of anti-tank guns
was dealt with by converting

934
00:57:46.020 --> 00:57:48.530
anti-aircraft artillery to the task

935
00:57:48.530 --> 00:57:50.363
of attempting to halt the Panzers.

936
00:57:51.230 --> 00:57:54.330
Six brigades of Naval
infantry and students were

937
00:57:54.330 --> 00:57:56.870
formed and reinforcements drafted in

938
00:57:56.870 --> 00:57:59.180
from the Karelian Isthmus.

939
00:57:59.180 --> 00:58:02.000
Zhukov began to take
the fight to the Germans

940
00:58:02.000 --> 00:58:04.360
through raids and counter attacks.

941
00:58:04.360 --> 00:58:07.640
But by now the German troops
had pierced the inner circle

942
00:58:07.640 --> 00:58:10.943
of defenses and were
rampaging through the suburbs.

943
00:58:13.290 --> 00:58:15.957
(rapid gunfire)

944
00:58:20.730 --> 00:58:24.000
After a furious exchange
of advances and retreats,

945
00:58:24.000 --> 00:58:25.250
by the end of the month,

946
00:58:25.250 --> 00:58:27.090
the defenders were hanging onto their city

947
00:58:27.090 --> 00:58:28.880
by their fingernails.

948
00:58:28.880 --> 00:58:32.290
It seemed inevitable that
Leningrad would capitulate,

949
00:58:32.290 --> 00:58:35.100
but as Zhukov awaited a renewed assault,

950
00:58:35.100 --> 00:58:37.890
the fourth Panzer group suddenly departed

951
00:58:37.890 --> 00:58:40.150
to join the battle for Moscow

952
00:58:40.150 --> 00:58:43.643
and the remaining German
forces began to build defenses.

953
00:58:44.770 --> 00:58:46.820
Hitler had decreed that Leningrad

954
00:58:46.820 --> 00:58:48.920
would not be taken by force.

955
00:58:48.920 --> 00:58:52.380
It would instead be
starved into submission,

956
00:58:52.380 --> 00:58:54.143
but there was a flaw in the plan.

957
00:58:55.730 --> 00:58:57.780
Although the supply
situation was difficult,

958
00:58:57.780 --> 00:58:59.570
without Panzer Group four

959
00:58:59.570 --> 00:59:03.193
the ring around the city
was never completely closed.

960
00:59:04.260 --> 00:59:07.690
It was still possible to reach
the city over land through

961
00:59:07.690 --> 00:59:10.840
the Virgin forests of
the Russian motherland.

962
00:59:10.840 --> 00:59:14.150
It was also possible to
bring in supplies by boat,

963
00:59:14.150 --> 00:59:15.800
across the waters of Lake Lagoda.

964
00:59:20.420 --> 00:59:23.040
In October, there was
some temporary relief

965
00:59:23.040 --> 00:59:24.900
for the defenders.

966
00:59:24.900 --> 00:59:28.980
The roads had disintegrated
into canals of bottomless mud

967
00:59:28.980 --> 00:59:32.640
along which wheeled vehicles
could drive only at a snail's

968
00:59:32.640 --> 00:59:36.083
pace and only if they were towed by tanks.

969
00:59:37.580 --> 00:59:41.430
This was the "rasputitsa",
the season of mud,

970
00:59:41.430 --> 00:59:43.510
which came as a debilitating surprise

971
00:59:43.510 --> 00:59:46.200
to the Germans in 1941,

972
00:59:46.200 --> 00:59:49.940
general Raus went to great
lengths after the war to explain

973
00:59:49.940 --> 00:59:52.203
the great significance
of the muddy season.

974
00:59:54.527 --> 00:59:58.450
"German losses of tanks and
motorized equipment of all types

975
00:59:58.450 --> 01:00:00.750
were extraordinarily
high during the autumn

976
01:00:00.750 --> 01:00:03.290
muddy period of 1941.

977
01:00:03.290 --> 01:00:07.680
The first time that the mud
of Russia was encountered a

978
01:00:07.680 --> 01:00:10.880
division of the fourth Panzer
group operating in the area

979
01:00:10.880 --> 01:00:13.960
North of Gzhatsk, during the same period,

980
01:00:13.960 --> 01:00:17.240
lost 50 tanks without a shot being fired.

981
01:00:17.240 --> 01:00:19.193
35 of them within three days,

982
01:00:20.160 --> 01:00:23.110
these losses were
extremely serious since no

983
01:00:23.110 --> 01:00:24.887
replacements were received."

984
01:00:35.770 --> 01:00:38.950
The Germans had no conception
of mud as it exists

985
01:00:38.950 --> 01:00:41.080
in European Russia.

986
01:00:41.080 --> 01:00:43.230
In the autumn of 1941,

987
01:00:43.230 --> 01:00:46.310
when frontline troops
were already stuck fast,

988
01:00:46.310 --> 01:00:49.300
the German high command still
believed that mud could be

989
01:00:49.300 --> 01:00:51.590
conquered by brute force.

990
01:00:51.590 --> 01:00:53.560
An idea that led to serious losses

991
01:00:53.560 --> 01:00:55.313
of vehicles and equipment.

992
01:00:56.470 --> 01:00:58.070
At the height of the muddy season,

993
01:00:58.070 --> 01:01:00.880
tractors and recovery
vehicles normally capable

994
01:01:00.880 --> 01:01:03.890
of traversing difficult
terrain are helpless,

995
01:01:03.890 --> 01:01:06.230
and attempts to plow
through the muddy mass

996
01:01:06.230 --> 01:01:09.160
makes roads even more impassable.

997
01:01:09.160 --> 01:01:11.540
Tanks, heavy recovery vehicles,

998
01:01:11.540 --> 01:01:14.030
and even vehicles with
good ground clearance

999
01:01:14.030 --> 01:01:17.550
simply pushed an ever-growing
wall of mud before them,

1000
01:01:17.550 --> 01:01:22.050
until they finally stopped half
buried by their own motion.

1001
01:01:34.320 --> 01:01:36.860
A sudden frost in the autumn of 1941,

1002
01:01:36.860 --> 01:01:39.770
cemented a crippled buried column

1003
01:01:39.770 --> 01:01:42.100
into a state of complete uselessness.

1004
01:01:42.100 --> 01:01:43.623
And it never moved again.

1005
01:01:44.770 --> 01:01:47.270
Because it could not be
reached in any other way,

1006
01:01:47.270 --> 01:01:51.640
gasoline, tow ropes and food
supplies were airdropped along

1007
01:01:51.640 --> 01:01:53.690
the line of stranded armor,

1008
01:01:53.690 --> 01:01:56.083
but all attempts to move, were futile.

1009
01:02:08.570 --> 01:02:11.490
Often when drivers found
themselves bogged down

1010
01:02:11.490 --> 01:02:13.320
far from any habitation,

1011
01:02:13.320 --> 01:02:16.990
they abandoned their vehicles
and set out on foot to contact

1012
01:02:16.990 --> 01:02:19.340
friendly troops in the nearest village

1013
01:02:19.340 --> 01:02:20.610
or sought food and shelter

1014
01:02:20.610 --> 01:02:24.230
from local civilians in
order to remain alive until

1015
01:02:24.230 --> 01:02:26.363
the worst of the muddy season passed.

1016
01:02:29.410 --> 01:02:33.290
For the muddy seasons, vehicles
with high ground clearance,

1017
01:02:33.290 --> 01:02:37.530
lightweight and low unit
ground pressure were necessary.

1018
01:02:37.530 --> 01:02:40.790
German trucks had low ground
clearance and could not get

1019
01:02:40.790 --> 01:02:43.090
traction in deep mud.

1020
01:02:43.090 --> 01:02:46.410
Since German supply cars had
wheels too narrow for muddy

1021
01:02:46.410 --> 01:02:50.900
terrain, they sank deep into soft ground.

1022
01:02:50.900 --> 01:02:53.510
Even the German Maultier and Ost schlepper

1023
01:02:53.510 --> 01:02:56.360
of the later years were bogged down in mud

1024
01:02:56.360 --> 01:02:58.233
as their tracks were too narrow.

1025
01:02:59.140 --> 01:03:01.380
Raus noted that the awkward looking

1026
01:03:01.380 --> 01:03:04.780
and slow Russian tractor
of pre-war vintage

1027
01:03:04.780 --> 01:03:08.240
salvaged the heaviest
most deeply mired loads

1028
01:03:08.240 --> 01:03:10.523
after German equipment
failed to budge them.

1029
01:03:26.820 --> 01:03:30.970
Inside Leningrad, food
supplies to the besieged city

1030
01:03:30.970 --> 01:03:33.920
had been diminishing
throughout the autumn.

1031
01:03:33.920 --> 01:03:35.220
By late November,

1032
01:03:35.220 --> 01:03:37.640
they were at their lowest
ebb for the entire duration

1033
01:03:37.640 --> 01:03:38.533
of the siege.

1034
01:03:39.700 --> 01:03:41.240
Manual workers were receiving

1035
01:03:41.240 --> 01:03:44.700
only 250 grams of bread per day.

1036
01:03:44.700 --> 01:03:47.500
One third of their normal requirement.

1037
01:03:47.500 --> 01:03:49.440
Without water for sanitation

1038
01:03:49.440 --> 01:03:51.430
and basic medical supplies,

1039
01:03:51.430 --> 01:03:53.253
disease became inevitable.

1040
01:03:54.430 --> 01:03:56.360
As winter arrived and temperatures

1041
01:03:56.360 --> 01:03:58.130
fell to the minus twenties,

1042
01:03:58.130 --> 01:04:01.340
thousands began to die each day.

1043
01:04:01.340 --> 01:04:04.063
Total starvation threatened constantly.

1044
01:04:04.990 --> 01:04:06.000
To the Germans

1045
01:04:06.000 --> 01:04:07.603
collapse seemed imminent.

1046
01:04:26.800 --> 01:04:29.520
Back in Berlin, a
reception with Adolf Hitler

1047
01:04:29.520 --> 01:04:30.540
as a guest of honor,

1048
01:04:30.540 --> 01:04:33.523
was organized to celebrate
the fall of the stricken city.

1049
01:04:35.440 --> 01:04:38.923
The invitations were
printed, but never posted.

1050
01:04:47.930 --> 01:04:51.283
Russian resistance remained
stubborn and defiant.

1051
01:04:52.520 --> 01:04:56.760
Even women soldiers in the
Red Army were in combat units,

1052
01:04:56.760 --> 01:04:59.670
the ferocity and
inhumanity of the conflict

1053
01:04:59.670 --> 01:05:01.093
beggars the imagination.

1054
01:05:03.335 --> 01:05:06.085
(engine rumbles)

1055
01:05:11.110 --> 01:05:13.590
In an attempt to relieve
the appalling conditions

1056
01:05:13.590 --> 01:05:16.100
in the city, the Russians marked a road

1057
01:05:16.100 --> 01:05:19.710
across the frozen Southwest
corner of Lake Ladoga.

1058
01:05:19.710 --> 01:05:23.770
And by the 22nd of November,
convoys of supply lorries

1059
01:05:23.770 --> 01:05:26.683
were just managing to stave
off famine in the city.

1060
01:05:29.640 --> 01:05:32.800
It was a hazardous passage
through the biting Northeastern

1061
01:05:32.800 --> 01:05:34.803
gales, which swept across the Lake.

1062
01:05:42.510 --> 01:05:44.730
The German Luftwaffe also did its best

1063
01:05:44.730 --> 01:05:48.333
to intercept the convoys and
break the surface of the ice.

1064
01:05:56.140 --> 01:05:57.710
Yet for all its horror,

1065
01:05:57.710 --> 01:06:01.190
the Russians knew that defending
this lifeline to the city

1066
01:06:01.190 --> 01:06:04.673
was the only possible way of
keeping the inhabitants alive.

1067
01:06:08.540 --> 01:06:11.707
(airplane roars past)

1068
01:06:15.018 --> 01:06:17.790
(quick succession of blasts)

1069
01:06:17.790 --> 01:06:19.060
But for some,

1070
01:06:19.060 --> 01:06:22.963
the food coming across the
ice was too little too late.

1071
01:06:23.870 --> 01:06:27.750
Victims of starvation, suffering
from falling blood pressure

1072
01:06:27.750 --> 01:06:31.110
and the wasting of the heart
and internal organs would never

1073
01:06:31.110 --> 01:06:33.260
regain their health.

1074
01:06:33.260 --> 01:06:35.570
Many would die months after food

1075
01:06:35.570 --> 01:06:38.380
and medical supplies finally arrived.

1076
01:06:38.380 --> 01:06:41.840
The children who survived would
emerge totally traumatized

1077
01:06:41.840 --> 01:06:44.783
by the siege as an eyewitness recalled.

1078
01:06:46.877 --> 01:06:50.530
"It was reflected in the way
many of the children played all

1079
01:06:50.530 --> 01:06:54.800
by themselves in the way that
even in that collective games,

1080
01:06:54.800 --> 01:06:58.383
they played in silence with grave faces.

1081
01:06:59.430 --> 01:07:01.200
I saw faces of children,

1082
01:07:01.200 --> 01:07:05.120
which reflected such thoughtfulness
and sorrow that those

1083
01:07:05.120 --> 01:07:08.940
eyes and faces told one more
than could be gathered from all

1084
01:07:08.940 --> 01:07:11.237
the stories of the horrors of famine."

1085
01:07:21.210 --> 01:07:25.010
As events unfolded it soon
became clear that in spite of all

1086
01:07:25.010 --> 01:07:27.510
the hardships of the siege of Leningrad,

1087
01:07:27.510 --> 01:07:30.560
the Northern sector was
considered by both sides

1088
01:07:30.560 --> 01:07:33.200
to be of secondary importance.

1089
01:07:33.200 --> 01:07:34.690
The men of Army Group North

1090
01:07:34.690 --> 01:07:36.750
soon became convinced
that they were fighting

1091
01:07:36.750 --> 01:07:41.170
what they referred to as, "the
eternal war of the poor man".

1092
01:07:41.170 --> 01:07:43.510
Casualties along the
whole of the Russian front

1093
01:07:43.510 --> 01:07:44.830
had been enormous,

1094
01:07:44.830 --> 01:07:47.920
but only 67,000
replacements were allocated

1095
01:07:47.920 --> 01:07:49.940
to army group North

1096
01:07:49.940 --> 01:07:53.560
as against 131,000 to Army Group Center

1097
01:07:53.560 --> 01:07:56.773
and 119,000 to Army Group South.

1098
01:08:02.380 --> 01:08:04.530
When it came to allocating fresh divisions

1099
01:08:04.530 --> 01:08:06.450
from the reserves, the situation

1100
01:08:06.450 --> 01:08:08.300
was even less favorable.

1101
01:08:08.300 --> 01:08:10.440
Of 21 new divisions released

1102
01:08:10.440 --> 01:08:13.560
by army high command
in the autumn of 1941,

1103
01:08:13.560 --> 01:08:17.350
only three were allocated
to Army Group North.

1104
01:08:17.350 --> 01:08:19.650
It was a further indication
of things to come.

1105
01:08:29.030 --> 01:08:32.430
One unexpected benefit for the
Army Group was the occasional

1106
01:08:32.430 --> 01:08:35.090
support which they received
from German Naval units

1107
01:08:35.090 --> 01:08:36.423
operating in the Baltic.

1108
01:08:37.270 --> 01:08:39.960
As one flank rested on the Baltic seas

1109
01:08:39.960 --> 01:08:42.450
Army Group North was the
only formation which could

1110
01:08:42.450 --> 01:08:45.263
look for substantial support
from the Kriegsmarine.

1111
01:08:52.820 --> 01:08:55.290
The German Navy had
played a significant role

1112
01:08:55.290 --> 01:08:57.520
in the Soviet German war.

1113
01:08:57.520 --> 01:08:58.560
In the Baltic,

1114
01:08:58.560 --> 01:08:59.800
the Germans sealed up

1115
01:08:59.800 --> 01:09:02.910
the powerful Russian
front with minefields.

1116
01:09:02.910 --> 01:09:03.890
By doing so,

1117
01:09:03.890 --> 01:09:06.693
they also trapped the
Soviet submarine fleet.

1118
01:09:08.010 --> 01:09:11.300
As the Germans advanced
along the Baltic coastline,

1119
01:09:11.300 --> 01:09:15.010
they took control of Russian
bases so that the Soviet Baltic

1120
01:09:15.010 --> 01:09:17.953
fleet had to remain
bottled up in Leningrad.

1121
01:09:30.700 --> 01:09:34.730
The function of the Soviet
Baltic fleet during 1941 and 42

1122
01:09:34.730 --> 01:09:38.410
was limited solely to supplying
fire support to the Soviet

1123
01:09:38.410 --> 01:09:40.693
forces fighting to defend the city.

1124
01:09:52.340 --> 01:09:55.080
This aspect of the fighting
was also to provide the stage

1125
01:09:55.080 --> 01:10:00.040
for a daring attack led by the
Stukas of Hans-Ulrich Rudel.

1126
01:10:00.040 --> 01:10:01.240
The Luftwaffe was ordered

1127
01:10:01.240 --> 01:10:04.400
to sink the Soviet battleship Marat.

1128
01:10:04.400 --> 01:10:07.530
Rudel managed this amazing
feat in the face of fierce

1129
01:10:07.530 --> 01:10:11.443
anti-aircraft fire with a
single well-placed bomb.

1130
01:10:15.385 --> 01:10:17.320
(waves crashing)

1131
01:10:17.320 --> 01:10:18.640
On the deficit side,

1132
01:10:18.640 --> 01:10:20.990
the 18th army had to
become involved in a number

1133
01:10:20.990 --> 01:10:24.460
of amphibious operations to
capture the Baltic islands,

1134
01:10:24.460 --> 01:10:26.600
which placed a great
strain on what were already

1135
01:10:26.600 --> 01:10:28.573
severely limited resources.

1136
01:10:35.256 --> 01:10:36.949
(weapon blasts)

1137
01:10:36.949 --> 01:10:38.510
(deep boom)

1138
01:10:38.510 --> 01:10:41.300
(fire crackles)

1139
01:10:41.300 --> 01:10:43.400
Throughout the whole course of the war,

1140
01:10:43.400 --> 01:10:46.480
the lack of powerful
reinforcements severely limited

1141
01:10:46.480 --> 01:10:50.120
the strategic options available
for the Army Group command.

1142
01:10:50.120 --> 01:10:53.010
It also required a great
deal of juggling of available

1143
01:10:53.010 --> 01:10:56.730
divisions to maintain the
extended frontline and the siege

1144
01:10:56.730 --> 01:11:00.593
of Leningrad, which was to
drag on for almost three years.

1145
01:11:06.107 --> 01:11:09.107
(people chattering)

1146
01:11:10.930 --> 01:11:13.400
The Germans had closed
right up on the city

1147
01:11:13.400 --> 01:11:18.200
and into the outer suburbs,
but the ring was not closed.

1148
01:11:18.200 --> 01:11:19.450
An important consideration

1149
01:11:19.450 --> 01:11:21.823
at this time was the role of the Fins.

1150
01:11:22.740 --> 01:11:26.230
They agreed to move close to
Leningrad, their fifth general

1151
01:11:26.230 --> 01:11:28.640
Mannerheim making it quite
clear that he was prepared

1152
01:11:28.640 --> 01:11:31.260
to take action to recover
Finnish territory,

1153
01:11:31.260 --> 01:11:34.540
yielded to Russia in
the winter war of 1939,

1154
01:11:34.540 --> 01:11:37.420
but that he would not take
part in the direct attack

1155
01:11:37.420 --> 01:11:39.319
on Leningrad itself.

1156
01:11:39.319 --> 01:11:42.880
(gentle guitar music)

1157
01:11:42.880 --> 01:11:45.200
That was one of the
conditions Finland made

1158
01:11:45.200 --> 01:11:47.230
on entering the war against Russia

1159
01:11:47.230 --> 01:11:48.803
on the side of the Germans.

1160
01:11:49.974 --> 01:11:51.040
Mannerheim was as mindful

1161
01:11:51.040 --> 01:11:53.000
of the political conditions as he was

1162
01:11:53.000 --> 01:11:55.810
of the military conditions
because of Finland's

1163
01:11:55.810 --> 01:11:58.223
vulnerability to future
Russian aggression.

1164
01:11:59.530 --> 01:12:01.870
This meant that the German
and Finnish armies were never

1165
01:12:01.870 --> 01:12:04.270
able to cut off Leningrad completely

1166
01:12:04.270 --> 01:12:06.490
from the rest of the world.

1167
01:12:06.490 --> 01:12:08.310
In both winter and summer,

1168
01:12:08.310 --> 01:12:11.160
the Russian forces were still
able to get resources across

1169
01:12:11.160 --> 01:12:13.823
Lake Ladoga in the Northeast of the city.

1170
01:12:14.970 --> 01:12:17.550
From the winter of 1942 onwards,

1171
01:12:17.550 --> 01:12:20.890
the railway to the East
of Leningrad was completed

1172
01:12:20.890 --> 01:12:24.130
and Leningrad was connected to
the rest of the Soviet union,

1173
01:12:24.130 --> 01:12:26.640
which enabled the forces
to supply the inhabitants

1174
01:12:26.640 --> 01:12:30.113
of the city, helping some of
them to survive the siege.

1175
01:12:34.010 --> 01:12:37.040
The Soviet negotiators in the
Soviet Finnish peace talks,

1176
01:12:37.040 --> 01:12:39.270
which took place in 1944,

1177
01:12:39.270 --> 01:12:42.330
actually recalled that the
Russians recognized what the Fins

1178
01:12:42.330 --> 01:12:43.233
had done for them.

1179
01:12:44.070 --> 01:12:47.840
If the Fins had moved forward
and closed the ring of siege

1180
01:12:47.840 --> 01:12:51.393
around Leningrad, it would've
meant the death of the city.

1181
01:12:54.630 --> 01:12:56.400
Despite the fact that some supplies

1182
01:12:56.400 --> 01:12:59.360
got through, it was precious little.

1183
01:12:59.360 --> 01:13:03.110
Starvation drove the
population to extreme measures,

1184
01:13:03.110 --> 01:13:06.023
including the horrifying
excess of cannibalism.

1185
01:13:07.530 --> 01:13:11.243
The first cases occurred at the
beginning of December, 1941.

1186
01:13:12.180 --> 01:13:14.040
The Soviet criminal code

1187
01:13:14.040 --> 01:13:17.123
made no mention of such
a crime as cannibalism.

1188
01:13:18.040 --> 01:13:21.110
So Soviet officials could at
first only define it as an

1189
01:13:21.110 --> 01:13:23.253
extreme form of banditry.

1190
01:13:24.520 --> 01:13:26.790
According to the top secret
report of the military

1191
01:13:26.790 --> 01:13:30.040
procurator of Leningrad, A. A Kuznetsov,

1192
01:13:30.040 --> 01:13:32.710
dated 27th of February, 1942

1193
01:13:33.690 --> 01:13:36.820
investigations of cannibalism
led to criminal charges

1194
01:13:36.820 --> 01:13:41.110
against 26 individuals in December, 1941,

1195
01:13:41.110 --> 01:13:45.343
366 in January, 1942 and 494

1196
01:13:46.840 --> 01:13:49.843
in the first two weeks of February, 1942.

1197
01:13:51.190 --> 01:13:54.070
Investigation revealed that
not only was human flesh

1198
01:13:54.070 --> 01:13:56.290
consumed by individuals,

1199
01:13:56.290 --> 01:13:58.963
but it was also sold to other citizens.

1200
01:13:59.860 --> 01:14:04.860
By the 20th of February 1942,
866 individuals were under

1201
01:14:04.960 --> 01:14:08.320
criminal investigation
or actual indictment

1202
01:14:08.320 --> 01:14:09.963
for suspected cannibalism.

1203
01:14:11.380 --> 01:14:15.093
Only 18% of this number had
any previous criminal record.

1204
01:14:19.120 --> 01:14:24.120
Of the 886 suspect
individuals, 322 were men

1205
01:14:24.470 --> 01:14:27.490
and 564 women.

1206
01:14:27.490 --> 01:14:31.230
Almost 30% were aged over 40.

1207
01:14:31.230 --> 01:14:33.833
The next largest group
being in their thirties.

1208
01:14:38.600 --> 01:14:39.945
More ghoulish still,

1209
01:14:39.945 --> 01:14:42.630
was the discovery of extensive intrusions

1210
01:14:42.630 --> 01:14:46.093
into cemeteries and the
mutilation of the recent dead.

1211
01:14:47.160 --> 01:14:49.480
One evening in March, 1942,

1212
01:14:49.480 --> 01:14:52.210
the watchman at the Piskaryovskoye
cemetery detained a woman

1213
01:14:52.210 --> 01:14:53.710
with a sack.

1214
01:14:53.710 --> 01:14:58.033
Once opened, the sack revealed
the bodies of five infants.

1215
01:14:59.110 --> 01:15:02.440
The increase in cannibalism
forced the city authorities

1216
01:15:02.440 --> 01:15:06.023
to set up police guards at
all the major cemeteries.

1217
01:15:09.360 --> 01:15:14.063
With the first snows of 1941
came a cruelly bitter winter.

1218
01:15:14.950 --> 01:15:18.050
The temperature continued to
fall and the German soldiers

1219
01:15:18.050 --> 01:15:21.110
now paid dearly for the
arrogance of the high command

1220
01:15:21.110 --> 01:15:23.750
that had refused to admit the
possibility of anything other

1221
01:15:23.750 --> 01:15:25.913
than a quick decisive campaign.

1222
01:15:26.760 --> 01:15:30.860
Few men in the German trenches
had more than summer clothing

1223
01:15:30.860 --> 01:15:33.713
and frostbite took an agonizing tole.

1224
01:15:35.980 --> 01:15:38.490
German machinery and guns
had never been designed

1225
01:15:38.490 --> 01:15:40.800
to function in such extremes.

1226
01:15:40.800 --> 01:15:44.560
Engines seized up, metal
tank tracks split apart

1227
01:15:44.560 --> 01:15:48.140
in the cold, ammunition would not fire.

1228
01:15:48.140 --> 01:15:49.580
The fierceness of the cold

1229
01:15:49.580 --> 01:15:52.633
was far beyond the
experience of most Germans.

1230
01:16:08.980 --> 01:16:11.813
(tank roars past)

1231
01:16:13.870 --> 01:16:14.740
(distant explosions)

1232
01:16:14.740 --> 01:16:17.850
Emboldened by the problems
they saw in the German ranks

1233
01:16:17.850 --> 01:16:20.890
a series of Soviet counterattacks
managed to roll back

1234
01:16:20.890 --> 01:16:24.050
many of the German gains around Leningrad.

1235
01:16:24.050 --> 01:16:25.780
With incredible exertions,

1236
01:16:25.780 --> 01:16:28.373
the Germans kept up a
semblance of defense.

1237
01:16:29.480 --> 01:16:32.530
The tactics of winter warfare
centered around contests

1238
01:16:32.530 --> 01:16:36.560
for the possession of
roads and inhabited places.

1239
01:16:36.560 --> 01:16:38.530
In Russia, villages and roads

1240
01:16:38.530 --> 01:16:40.320
were infinitely more important than they

1241
01:16:40.320 --> 01:16:42.820
were on the rest of the continent.

1242
01:16:42.820 --> 01:16:44.700
In other German theaters of war,

1243
01:16:44.700 --> 01:16:48.710
no one particular road ever
became a crucial factor

1244
01:16:48.710 --> 01:16:50.580
since a well-developed road network

1245
01:16:50.580 --> 01:16:53.500
always offered a choice
of alternate routes.

1246
01:16:53.500 --> 01:16:56.380
In Russia, the possession of a single road

1247
01:16:56.380 --> 01:16:57.590
was often a matter of life

1248
01:16:57.590 --> 01:16:59.673
or death for an entire army.

1249
01:17:00.690 --> 01:17:04.080
The extreme tactical importance
of inhabited places during

1250
01:17:04.080 --> 01:17:07.310
the six months of winter explains
the fact that the Russians

1251
01:17:07.310 --> 01:17:10.460
would frequently much rather
destroy them than surrender

1252
01:17:10.460 --> 01:17:11.360
them to the enemy.

1253
01:17:28.840 --> 01:17:31.820
In the bitter trench
warfare outside Leningrad,

1254
01:17:31.820 --> 01:17:34.720
the defender had a definite
advantage in winter

1255
01:17:34.720 --> 01:17:36.320
because as a rule,

1256
01:17:36.320 --> 01:17:39.000
their positions could
not be seen in the snow,

1257
01:17:39.000 --> 01:17:40.893
except at very close range.

1258
01:17:41.850 --> 01:17:44.870
The defenders were able to
keep their forces undercover

1259
01:17:44.870 --> 01:17:46.710
and wait until the moment their fire

1260
01:17:46.710 --> 01:17:48.303
could be used most effectively.

1261
01:17:49.470 --> 01:17:53.950
The attacker was also
impeded and easily detected

1262
01:17:53.950 --> 01:17:55.573
even in camouflaged clothing.

1263
01:17:58.530 --> 01:18:02.050
The principal weapon of the
defender became the machine gun

1264
01:18:02.050 --> 01:18:05.010
as its performance was
not diminished by snow

1265
01:18:05.010 --> 01:18:07.410
in which mortars and light artillery lost

1266
01:18:07.410 --> 01:18:08.883
most of their effectiveness.

1267
01:18:15.400 --> 01:18:17.680
Replacements were also becoming a problem

1268
01:18:17.680 --> 01:18:19.740
for the German forces.

1269
01:18:19.740 --> 01:18:20.573
After the war,

1270
01:18:20.573 --> 01:18:23.390
it became clear from the
diaries of Army Group North

1271
01:18:23.390 --> 01:18:26.310
that the commanders of both
formations had intentionally

1272
01:18:26.310 --> 01:18:29.210
prohibited, even during calm periods,

1273
01:18:29.210 --> 01:18:32.230
the removal of a unit from
the front in order to grant it

1274
01:18:32.230 --> 01:18:33.930
a period of rest.

1275
01:18:33.930 --> 01:18:37.090
It was better to keep the
divisions at the front and assign

1276
01:18:37.090 --> 01:18:39.160
them to a narrower sector

1277
01:18:39.160 --> 01:18:41.420
as otherwise a reserve unit,

1278
01:18:41.420 --> 01:18:44.120
which had been removed from
the Northern front was certain

1279
01:18:44.120 --> 01:18:47.410
to be taken by the Supreme
command and assigned more

1280
01:18:47.410 --> 01:18:50.290
pressing pressure points
on either the central

1281
01:18:50.290 --> 01:18:51.390
or the Southern front.

1282
01:18:52.607 --> 01:18:53.924
(distant gunfire)

1283
01:18:53.924 --> 01:18:56.740
(loud explosion)

1284
01:18:56.740 --> 01:18:58.860
Although the Northern
front was regarded as being

1285
01:18:58.860 --> 01:19:03.063
of secondary importance, it
was in no sense, a backwater.

1286
01:19:03.900 --> 01:19:06.450
There was still a great deal
of terrible fighting in very

1287
01:19:06.450 --> 01:19:10.530
difficult terrain with
extensive swamps and few roads

1288
01:19:10.530 --> 01:19:13.350
through the vast sections
of trackless forest,

1289
01:19:13.350 --> 01:19:15.623
which presented a logistical nightmare.

1290
01:19:20.530 --> 01:19:23.530
Army group North and the army
divisions were facing the most

1291
01:19:23.530 --> 01:19:26.340
difficult conditions on the Eastern front.

1292
01:19:26.340 --> 01:19:29.640
The climate and the terrain
were completely different.

1293
01:19:29.640 --> 01:19:33.510
Around Leningrad, it is
very marshy and boggy.

1294
01:19:33.510 --> 01:19:35.490
There were also very few roads.

1295
01:19:35.490 --> 01:19:38.743
So all transport logistics
were very difficult indeed.

1296
01:19:51.630 --> 01:19:53.960
To compound the difficulties
for the Germans,

1297
01:19:53.960 --> 01:19:56.140
by October of 1941,

1298
01:19:56.140 --> 01:19:59.270
the first partisan attacks
had begun to cause severe

1299
01:19:59.270 --> 01:20:01.193
difficulties in the rear areas.

1300
01:20:02.190 --> 01:20:04.720
The effects of these attacks
were further compounded

1301
01:20:04.720 --> 01:20:06.170
by the fact that the underdeveloped

1302
01:20:06.170 --> 01:20:07.940
infrastructure of Russia

1303
01:20:07.940 --> 01:20:10.230
meant that there were
very few roads or railways

1304
01:20:10.230 --> 01:20:12.310
which could be used as alternatives

1305
01:20:12.310 --> 01:20:14.863
to those blocked by partisan activity.

1306
01:20:16.660 --> 01:20:19.180
The Russian winter was a nightmare

1307
01:20:19.180 --> 01:20:21.450
along the whole of the front,

1308
01:20:21.450 --> 01:20:23.090
but it was Army Group North

1309
01:20:23.090 --> 01:20:27.260
which bore the brunt of the
most extreme Russian winters.

1310
01:20:27.260 --> 01:20:30.510
It is impossible to
exaggerate the cruel realities

1311
01:20:30.510 --> 01:20:34.013
of fighting in the ferocious
winters of Northern Russia.

1312
01:20:54.070 --> 01:20:55.840
In addition to their geographical

1313
01:20:55.840 --> 01:20:57.560
and climactic difficulties,

1314
01:20:57.560 --> 01:21:01.000
the fighting spirit of the Red
Army facing Army Group North

1315
01:21:01.000 --> 01:21:02.110
was no less intense

1316
01:21:02.110 --> 01:21:04.203
than that displayed on the other sectors.

1317
01:21:05.100 --> 01:21:07.720
The siege of Leningrad
has become synonymous

1318
01:21:07.720 --> 01:21:10.200
with endurance and suffering,

1319
01:21:10.200 --> 01:21:13.190
but there was also a great
deal of intense combat

1320
01:21:13.190 --> 01:21:15.700
as a series of miniature battles rolled

1321
01:21:15.700 --> 01:21:16.870
backwards and forwards

1322
01:21:16.870 --> 01:21:19.233
around the siege lines outside Leningrad.

1323
01:21:20.490 --> 01:21:23.157
(weapon blasts)

1324
01:21:25.668 --> 01:21:28.335
(weapon blasts)

1325
01:21:29.627 --> 01:21:33.157
(distant gunfire)

1326
01:21:33.157 --> 01:21:35.824
(weapon blasts)

1327
01:21:39.320 --> 01:21:41.290
Despite coming very close to victory

1328
01:21:41.290 --> 01:21:43.030
on a number of occasions,

1329
01:21:43.030 --> 01:21:45.580
Army Group North was never
able to close the ring

1330
01:21:45.580 --> 01:21:48.090
around Leningrad completely.

1331
01:21:48.090 --> 01:21:51.270
And the high command continued
to draw desperately needed

1332
01:21:51.270 --> 01:21:54.260
divisions away from the
Army Group North sector,

1333
01:21:54.260 --> 01:21:57.023
in order to feed other
hard-pressed sectors.

1334
01:21:58.150 --> 01:22:01.040
The result of this attrition
from two directions

1335
01:22:01.040 --> 01:22:05.230
was that a ferocious Soviet
offensive in January, 1944,

1336
01:22:05.230 --> 01:22:06.990
finally broke the resistance

1337
01:22:06.990 --> 01:22:10.093
of Army Group North and raised the siege.

1338
01:22:11.360 --> 01:22:15.000
The lifting of the siege
of Leningrad in 1944

1339
01:22:15.000 --> 01:22:16.380
forced Army Group North

1340
01:22:16.380 --> 01:22:19.270
to fall back to a new defensive front

1341
01:22:19.270 --> 01:22:21.730
composed of a series of
partially constructed

1342
01:22:21.730 --> 01:22:24.917
defenses known as "The Panther line".

1343
01:22:25.910 --> 01:22:28.300
This line should have
represented a fallback position

1344
01:22:28.300 --> 01:22:32.823
for the German forces, but work
was beginning much too late.

1345
01:22:39.330 --> 01:22:42.180
The Panther line was envisaged
as a series of strong

1346
01:22:42.180 --> 01:22:45.770
fortifications incorporating
parts of the Northern regions

1347
01:22:45.770 --> 01:22:48.890
of the Soviet union in a
line running Southwards

1348
01:22:48.890 --> 01:22:51.860
from Lake Dvina and Lake Pscov

1349
01:22:51.860 --> 01:22:53.120
near the town of Nava

1350
01:22:53.120 --> 01:22:54.823
on the Baltic coast of Estonia.

1351
01:22:55.890 --> 01:22:57.980
It was envisaged that the German troops

1352
01:22:57.980 --> 01:23:00.020
retreating behind the line

1353
01:23:00.020 --> 01:23:03.133
would occupy a series of
excellent defensive points.

1354
01:23:04.170 --> 01:23:06.210
The German troops would
therefore have a respite

1355
01:23:06.210 --> 01:23:07.850
from the rigors of the retreat

1356
01:23:07.850 --> 01:23:10.313
and be able to hold
the Soviet army at bay.

1357
01:23:17.360 --> 01:23:19.590
Meanwhile, the armored formations

1358
01:23:19.590 --> 01:23:21.710
and the air formations of the German army

1359
01:23:21.710 --> 01:23:25.480
were repaired and returned
to the fray to renew combat

1360
01:23:25.480 --> 01:23:27.800
with their Soviet foes.

1361
01:23:27.800 --> 01:23:29.680
However, the Panther line

1362
01:23:29.680 --> 01:23:31.930
was constructed merely as an afterthought

1363
01:23:31.930 --> 01:23:33.293
when it was much too late.

1364
01:23:34.270 --> 01:23:36.480
The German armies had suffered defeats

1365
01:23:36.480 --> 01:23:37.530
and simply did not have

1366
01:23:37.530 --> 01:23:39.943
enough troops to man the line effectively.

1367
01:23:40.930 --> 01:23:43.010
In those areas where adequate defenses

1368
01:23:43.010 --> 01:23:44.660
had been prepared in the line

1369
01:23:44.660 --> 01:23:46.110
and there were sufficient German troops

1370
01:23:46.110 --> 01:23:47.790
and aircraft available,

1371
01:23:47.790 --> 01:23:49.840
it proved a very formidable obstacle

1372
01:23:49.840 --> 01:23:51.583
for the Soviet army to overcome.

1373
01:23:52.470 --> 01:23:54.430
Had it been properly prepared

1374
01:23:54.430 --> 01:23:57.800
as part of a coherent
overall strategic plan,

1375
01:23:57.800 --> 01:24:00.305
the Panther line could have been held.

1376
01:24:00.305 --> 01:24:03.305
(suspenseful music)

1377
01:24:12.050 --> 01:24:14.800
The Panther line was only ever
going to provide a temporary

1378
01:24:14.800 --> 01:24:17.973
solution to the mounting
problems of Army Group North.

1379
01:24:19.000 --> 01:24:21.960
The destruction of the
neighboring Army Group Center

1380
01:24:21.960 --> 01:24:23.940
in June, 1944,

1381
01:24:23.940 --> 01:24:27.790
tore a huge gap in the German
lines and left the right flank

1382
01:24:27.790 --> 01:24:31.203
of Army Group North
vulnerable to a Soviet attack.

1383
01:24:35.220 --> 01:24:39.570
Hitler was forced to sanction
another series of withdrawals.

1384
01:24:39.570 --> 01:24:41.840
From the Panther line, Army Group North

1385
01:24:41.840 --> 01:24:44.610
were forced to retreat
in relatively good order

1386
01:24:44.610 --> 01:24:48.180
towards Germany fighting a
series of ferocious defensive

1387
01:24:48.180 --> 01:24:50.010
battles as they went.

1388
01:24:50.010 --> 01:24:51.750
The most notable of these being

1389
01:24:51.750 --> 01:24:54.103
the defense of Nava in 1944.

1390
01:24:58.540 --> 01:25:01.130
The battle for Narva plays
a very important part

1391
01:25:01.130 --> 01:25:02.950
in the Soviet German war

1392
01:25:02.950 --> 01:25:06.540
because Narva is the gateway to Estonia.

1393
01:25:06.540 --> 01:25:10.290
The Germans recognized the
importance of holding Narva.

1394
01:25:10.290 --> 01:25:12.730
And there were initially
12 divisions organized

1395
01:25:12.730 --> 01:25:14.680
into what was called "Abteilung Narwa",

1396
01:25:15.560 --> 01:25:17.310
a special force grouping,

1397
01:25:17.310 --> 01:25:20.393
which was to fight with enormous
courage and distinction.

1398
01:25:26.930 --> 01:25:31.050
The defense of Narva was a
bitterly fought encounter.

1399
01:25:31.050 --> 01:25:33.470
A breakthrough here would have compromised

1400
01:25:33.470 --> 01:25:35.710
many German troops in the Baltic regions

1401
01:25:35.710 --> 01:25:38.190
of Estonia and Latvia.

1402
01:25:38.190 --> 01:25:40.760
European SS, along with the German

1403
01:25:40.760 --> 01:25:43.090
regular army divisions managed to hold

1404
01:25:43.090 --> 01:25:45.840
back the forces of the
Soviet Leningrad front

1405
01:25:45.840 --> 01:25:49.630
throughout January, February, and March.

1406
01:25:49.630 --> 01:25:53.230
Their bitter attritional
contest was not characterized

1407
01:25:53.230 --> 01:25:55.800
by sophisticated tactical maneuvers.

1408
01:25:55.800 --> 01:25:57.653
It was a bloody slugging-match.

1409
01:26:05.327 --> 01:26:08.160
(distant gunfire)

1410
01:26:12.948 --> 01:26:15.615
(weapon blasts)

1411
01:26:17.770 --> 01:26:21.370
The German formations were
saved by the early spring thaw

1412
01:26:21.370 --> 01:26:23.740
of late March, 1944,

1413
01:26:23.740 --> 01:26:28.020
which produced seas of mud
floods of at least one foot deep

1414
01:26:28.020 --> 01:26:31.720
in an area of 100 to 140 miles square.

1415
01:26:31.720 --> 01:26:35.940
Even Soviet tanks stuck
fast in the torrents of mud

1416
01:26:35.940 --> 01:26:39.263
and the German forces were
able to retreat once more.

1417
01:26:45.410 --> 01:26:48.880
The incredible resistance
offered by Army Group Narva,

1418
01:26:48.880 --> 01:26:51.520
a scratch formation drawn
from the slender resources

1419
01:26:51.520 --> 01:26:53.040
of Army Group North

1420
01:26:53.040 --> 01:26:54.860
represents an impressive example

1421
01:26:54.860 --> 01:26:56.800
of military improvisation

1422
01:26:56.800 --> 01:26:58.470
and stands comparison with the other

1423
01:26:58.470 --> 01:27:00.760
German defensive battles fought elsewhere

1424
01:27:00.760 --> 01:27:02.363
in Russia and Italy.

1425
01:27:03.580 --> 01:27:07.530
The mainstay of resistance in
Narva was the third SS Panzer

1426
01:27:07.530 --> 01:27:11.850
Corps, which included the long
serving SS police division

1427
01:27:11.850 --> 01:27:14.670
along with the new SS Viking division

1428
01:27:14.670 --> 01:27:18.042
comprised of volunteers from
different nationalities.

1429
01:27:18.042 --> 01:27:20.709
(rapid gunfire)

1430
01:27:23.900 --> 01:27:26.080
By October, 1944,

1431
01:27:26.080 --> 01:27:27.580
the situation around Narva

1432
01:27:27.580 --> 01:27:30.570
from a German point of view, was hopeless.

1433
01:27:30.570 --> 01:27:33.820
But unlike the countless
garrisons squandered by Hitler

1434
01:27:33.820 --> 01:27:37.770
in a pointless series of
hold-at-all-costs orders,

1435
01:27:37.770 --> 01:27:40.270
Army Group Narva managed to escape

1436
01:27:40.270 --> 01:27:42.543
and rejoin Army Group North.

1437
01:27:45.130 --> 01:27:48.660
Constant retreat was now the
order of the day as the army

1438
01:27:48.660 --> 01:27:49.770
group was driven back

1439
01:27:49.770 --> 01:27:52.093
through the Baltic States towards Germany.

1440
01:27:52.940 --> 01:27:55.883
But Army Group North
would never make it home.

1441
01:27:57.062 --> 01:28:00.229
(gentle guitar music)

1442
01:28:05.260 --> 01:28:07.950
While the Red Army
rolled on towards Berlin,

1443
01:28:07.950 --> 01:28:10.270
the men of Army Group
North were finally cornered

1444
01:28:10.270 --> 01:28:12.703
in the Courland peninsula of Latvia.

1445
01:28:13.770 --> 01:28:15.320
There, the battered remnants

1446
01:28:15.320 --> 01:28:17.120
of the Army Group held off all attacks

1447
01:28:17.120 --> 01:28:19.720
by the Red Army for six long months.

1448
01:28:19.720 --> 01:28:21.900
They were under siege from late October,

1449
01:28:21.900 --> 01:28:24.783
1944 through to May, 1945.

1450
01:28:31.230 --> 01:28:33.897
(weapon blasts)

1451
01:28:34.851 --> 01:28:37.518
(weapon blasts)

1452
01:28:39.053 --> 01:28:41.720
(rapid gunfire)

1453
01:28:57.990 --> 01:29:00.950
In January, 1945, the two armies,

1454
01:29:00.950 --> 01:29:04.800
which had served since
1941 as Army Group North

1455
01:29:04.800 --> 01:29:07.303
were renamed Army Group Courland.

1456
01:29:08.750 --> 01:29:11.130
The hard-won mantle of Army Group North

1457
01:29:11.130 --> 01:29:13.180
was transferred to a scratch assembly

1458
01:29:13.180 --> 01:29:15.580
of beaten units under the command

1459
01:29:15.580 --> 01:29:18.690
of a swift succession
of temporary leaders.

1460
01:29:18.690 --> 01:29:21.100
The spirit of the men of Army Group North

1461
01:29:21.100 --> 01:29:23.763
remained behind in Courland.

1462
01:29:24.713 --> 01:29:27.380
(ominous music)

1463
01:29:49.041 --> 01:29:49.980
(distant blasts)

1464
01:29:49.980 --> 01:29:50.950
The German divisions,

1465
01:29:50.950 --> 01:29:52.630
which found their way to Courland

1466
01:29:52.630 --> 01:29:54.260
were stuck there.

1467
01:29:54.260 --> 01:29:56.750
They were blockaded by the
Russians and there was nothing

1468
01:29:56.750 --> 01:29:57.990
they could do.

1469
01:29:57.990 --> 01:30:00.310
They could no longer make
any useful contribution

1470
01:30:00.310 --> 01:30:02.653
to the greater course
of the war elsewhere.

1471
01:30:03.510 --> 01:30:04.850
In many respects,

1472
01:30:04.850 --> 01:30:07.210
it was a very wasteful and irresponsible

1473
01:30:07.210 --> 01:30:09.103
gesture on the part of Hitler.

1474
01:30:10.130 --> 01:30:14.430
This albeit scratch army was
still a considerable force,

1475
01:30:14.430 --> 01:30:17.630
which could have made a
valuable contribution elsewhere,

1476
01:30:17.630 --> 01:30:19.430
but it was not to be made available.

1477
01:30:21.941 --> 01:30:25.024
(distant explosions)

1478
01:30:34.210 --> 01:30:36.310
Despite everything that
the besieged Red Army

1479
01:30:36.310 --> 01:30:37.410
could throw at them,

1480
01:30:37.410 --> 01:30:40.870
the surviving elements of
the 16th and 18th armies

1481
01:30:40.870 --> 01:30:43.350
now officially known
as Army Group Courland

1482
01:30:43.350 --> 01:30:46.020
continued to resist all further attempts

1483
01:30:46.020 --> 01:30:47.503
to force them into surrender.

1484
01:30:48.720 --> 01:30:52.560
Fighting for the Courland
peninsula was grinding in nature.

1485
01:30:52.560 --> 01:30:55.020
It was not like the
Western and Eastern fronts

1486
01:30:55.020 --> 01:30:57.180
characterized by large formations,

1487
01:30:57.180 --> 01:31:00.060
sweeping along the frontier
and impressive sophisticated

1488
01:31:00.060 --> 01:31:03.950
operations, in the Courland
fighting, the Germans

1489
01:31:03.950 --> 01:31:06.900
trapped in this region
were gradually, slowly

1490
01:31:06.900 --> 01:31:08.440
and surely pushed back

1491
01:31:08.440 --> 01:31:10.980
in spectacular fashion into something

1492
01:31:10.980 --> 01:31:14.043
of a geographical
cul-de-sac by the Red Army.

1493
01:31:30.787 --> 01:31:34.060
(waves crashing)

1494
01:31:34.060 --> 01:31:36.930
They were well served to
the bitter end by the ships

1495
01:31:36.930 --> 01:31:38.500
of the Kriegsmarine

1496
01:31:38.500 --> 01:31:40.470
who managed to evacuate some divisions

1497
01:31:40.470 --> 01:31:42.010
recalled to Germany.

1498
01:31:42.010 --> 01:31:44.150
On occasion, they even managed to bring in

1499
01:31:44.150 --> 01:31:46.173
some much needed reinforcements.

1500
01:31:47.860 --> 01:31:50.750
The German Navy did have
an important role to play

1501
01:31:50.750 --> 01:31:52.580
when the Red Army began to advance

1502
01:31:52.580 --> 01:31:56.320
along the Baltic coast to
break into East Prussia,

1503
01:31:56.320 --> 01:31:58.950
because if at all possible the German Navy

1504
01:31:58.950 --> 01:32:02.123
had to try and contain
Soviet Naval operations.

1505
01:32:02.980 --> 01:32:04.660
Even more importantly,

1506
01:32:04.660 --> 01:32:06.630
they had a grievous burden,

1507
01:32:06.630 --> 01:32:09.807
to try and evacuate as many
of the German civilians

1508
01:32:09.807 --> 01:32:11.310
and German military units

1509
01:32:11.310 --> 01:32:13.870
who had been trapped
and transport them back

1510
01:32:13.870 --> 01:32:15.855
into German territory.

1511
01:32:15.855 --> 01:32:18.855
(suspenseful music)

1512
01:32:23.133 --> 01:32:26.300
(airplane roars past)

1513
01:32:35.530 --> 01:32:38.440
The Naval aspect in the
closing stage of the war

1514
01:32:38.440 --> 01:32:40.510
does demonstrate that the German Navy

1515
01:32:40.510 --> 01:32:43.890
could operate well even
in the face of disaster,

1516
01:32:43.890 --> 01:32:45.263
which was now pending.

1517
01:32:50.530 --> 01:32:54.170
The Kriegsmarine was absolutely
vital in explaining why

1518
01:32:54.170 --> 01:32:56.010
German formations fought bitterly

1519
01:32:56.010 --> 01:32:57.630
to the end for the pointless

1520
01:32:57.630 --> 01:33:00.260
battle for the Courland peninsula.

1521
01:33:00.260 --> 01:33:02.810
The peninsula, from the
Army's point of view

1522
01:33:02.810 --> 01:33:04.970
was militarily useless,

1523
01:33:04.970 --> 01:33:09.970
indeed many German commanders
in late 1944 and spring 1945

1524
01:33:10.350 --> 01:33:11.740
constantly requested Hitler

1525
01:33:11.740 --> 01:33:13.623
to give up the Courland peninsula.

1526
01:33:14.660 --> 01:33:16.770
This would release the 26 divisions

1527
01:33:16.770 --> 01:33:18.070
that were fighting there

1528
01:33:18.070 --> 01:33:20.460
in order to bolster their defense in what

1529
01:33:20.460 --> 01:33:23.093
were more important military
regions nearer to home.

1530
01:33:33.235 --> 01:33:36.235
(distant explosion)

1531
01:33:39.131 --> 01:33:41.798
(rapid gunfire)

1532
01:33:46.440 --> 01:33:49.050
The German Navy had used
the Baltic sea throughout

1533
01:33:49.050 --> 01:33:51.540
World War Two as a training ground

1534
01:33:51.540 --> 01:33:54.216
for its submarine commanders.

1535
01:33:54.216 --> 01:33:56.060
Donitz, a committed Nazi

1536
01:33:56.060 --> 01:33:58.570
who was in charge of
the Navy at this stage,

1537
01:33:58.570 --> 01:34:01.370
regarded the retention of the
Gulf of Danzig in the Baltic

1538
01:34:01.370 --> 01:34:05.570
sea as essential in order to
train his submarine commanders

1539
01:34:05.570 --> 01:34:10.570
to use the extremely powerful
new submarine, the type 21,

1540
01:34:10.840 --> 01:34:12.680
which the German Navy were developing

1541
01:34:12.680 --> 01:34:14.103
towards the end of the war.

1542
01:34:15.050 --> 01:34:17.870
The Kriegsmarine therefore
played a critical role in

1543
01:34:17.870 --> 01:34:21.300
explaining why the German
formations fought so bitterly for

1544
01:34:21.300 --> 01:34:23.577
the Courland peninsula.

1545
01:34:23.577 --> 01:34:26.827
(weapon fires rapidly)

1546
01:34:55.240 --> 01:34:57.740
Trapped in Courland, the survivors

1547
01:34:57.740 --> 01:34:59.670
of the old Army Group North

1548
01:34:59.670 --> 01:35:03.150
maintained their cohesion
and fighting ability

1549
01:35:03.150 --> 01:35:06.383
until the final surrender
on may the eighth, 1945,

1550
01:35:07.710 --> 01:35:11.343
almost four years since they
had first moved into Russia.

1551
01:35:12.500 --> 01:35:16.620
On that day 203,000 men
began the long march

1552
01:35:16.620 --> 01:35:18.780
into Soviet captivity.

1553
01:35:18.780 --> 01:35:20.850
Many would never return.

1554
01:35:20.850 --> 01:35:23.800
And others were held as
slave laborers until 1955,

1555
01:35:25.210 --> 01:35:28.563
a high price to pay
for their long defense.

1556
01:35:34.060 --> 01:35:37.420
Of the three huge army groups
which Hitler sent into Russia,

1557
01:35:37.420 --> 01:35:40.300
it could be argued that Army
Group North was the most

1558
01:35:40.300 --> 01:35:44.040
successful in carrying out
the tasks assigned to it.

1559
01:35:44.040 --> 01:35:47.410
Although the campaign ultimately
ended in failure for them,

1560
01:35:47.410 --> 01:35:51.640
the men of Army Group North
retained their military cohesion

1561
01:35:51.640 --> 01:35:54.820
with some units achieving the
rare distinction of serving

1562
01:35:54.820 --> 01:35:56.520
for the whole four years

1563
01:35:56.520 --> 01:36:00.963
of the Russian war in the same army group.

1564
01:36:15.018 --> 01:36:17.685
(ominous music)